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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Claire Stratton Quinto 
Doctor of Philosophy 
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June 2020 
Title: Are Critics Right About Quarterly Earnings Guidance? An Examination of 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Managerial Myopia 
 
I examine the claim that managers who issue quarterly earnings guidance sacrifice 
long-term value to enhance short-term performance, i.e., that quarterly earnings guidance 
encourages myopic behavior. I find that quarterly guiders are more likely to meet 
quarterly earnings expectations and tend to use more short-term language in their 
corporate disclosures, supporting the view that quarterly earnings guidance shifts a 
manager’s attention to the short term. However, quarterly earnings guidance does not 
appear to have a negative impact on a firm’s long-term performance. Using an entropy-
balanced sample, I find that quarterly guiders outperform non-guiders over the next three 
and five years across a variety of performance measures. Also inconsistent with the 
claims of critics, I find no evidence that quarterly earnings guidance is associated with 
more earnings management or underinvestment. Taken together, my results do not 
support the view that quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia. Instead, it 
appears that among the firms that choose to provide it, the benefits of quarterly earnings 
guidance outweigh the costs.  
v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Claire Stratton Quinto 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 Southern Utah University, Cedar City 
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, Accounting, 2020, University of Oregon 
 Master of Accountancy, 2011, Southern Utah University 
 Bachelor of Science, Accounting, 2009, Southern Utah University 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Financial Accounting 
 Corporate Disclosures 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
Graduate Employee, Department of Accounting, University of Oregon, Eugene, 
Oregon, 2015-2020 
 
Accountant II, City of Boulder, Boulder, Colorado, 2015 
 
Senior Audit Associate/Audit Associate/Audit Intern, Piercy Bowler Taylor & 
Kern CPAs & Business Advisors, Las Vegas, Nevada, 2010-2013 
 
Tax Intern, HintonBurdick CPAs & Advisors, Cedar City, Utah, 2010 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of Accounting, University of Oregon, 
2015-2020 
 
Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Excellence in Reviewing Award, 
American Accounting Association, 2020 
 
vi 
Robin and Roger Best Research Award, Disclosure Policies in Quarterly Earnings 
Guidance, Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, 2019 
Robin and Roger Best Research Award, CEO of the Year Awards and Financial 
Disclosure Quality, Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, 
2019 
Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Doctoral Consortium Fellowship, 
American Accounting Association, 2019 
Robin and Roger Best Teaching Award, Lundquist College of Business, 
University of Oregon, 2018 
Robin and Roger Best Teaching Award, Lundquist College of Business, 
University of Oregon, 2017 
Summa cum Laude, Southern Utah University, 2009 
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I thank my dissertation committee chair and advisor, Dr. Steven Matsunaga, for 
his outstanding mentorship. Through his selfless dedication to my training, I have learned 
how to think rigorously about my ideas and conduct research with enthusiasm and 
integrity. This work would not have been possible without the countless hours he has 
invested in my education. I also thank the other members of my dissertation committee 
for their comments, advice, and encouragement. Dr. Angela Davis sparked my interest in 
corporate disclosure research and gave me ample opportunities to explore my teaching 
and research interests as a doctoral student. Dr. Kyle Peterson supplied me with 
invaluable advice on the academic job market and shared with me his expertise related to 
textual analysis. Dr. Trudy Cameron provided me with an excellent foundation in applied 
econometrics and helped me to become a better writer. I gratefully acknowledge financial 
support from the School of Accounting and the Lundquist College of Business at the 
University of Oregon. 
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my teachers, who fostered my love of scholarship and discovery.  
And to John, for his unwavering devotion and support.  
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ............................. 12 
Prior Literature ............................................................................................................ 12 
Hypothesis Development ............................................................................................ 14 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................................ 20 
Sample Selection ......................................................................................................... 20 
Entropy Balancing ...................................................................................................... 22 
Model Specification and Measurement of Key Variables .......................................... 24 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ............................................................................................. 28 
Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................... 28 
Determinants of Quarterly Earnings Guidance ........................................................... 28 
Primary Analyses ........................................................................................................ 29 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES ...................................................................................... 36 
Cross-Sectional Tests .................................................................................................. 36 
Earnings Management and Underinvestment ............................................................. 37 
Other Short-Term Pressures ........................................................................................ 40 
Robustness Tests ......................................................................................................... 41 
Propensity Score Matching Analysis .................................................................... 41 
Difference-In-Difference Analysis ....................................................................... 43 
Other Robustness Tests ......................................................................................... 46 
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 47 
x 
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................48 
A. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS ................................................................................ 48 
B. SPORADIC QUARTERLY EARNINGS GUIDANCE ...................................... 57 
C. TABLES ............................................................................................................... 59 
REFERENCES CITED ..................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter Page 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Sample Selection ......................................................................................................... 59 
2. Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................... 60 
3. Determinants of Quarterly Earnings Guidance ........................................................... 64 
4. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Short-Term Earnings Expectations ...................... 66 
5. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and 10-K and Conference Call Language ................... 68 
6. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance ...................................... 70 
7. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance Cross-Sections:
Information Asymmetry, Managerial Ability, and Litigation Risk ............................ 72 
8. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Earnings Management and Underinvestment ...... 74 
9. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance Cross-Sections:
Transient Institutional Ownership, Analyst Following, and Stock-Based
Compensation ............................................................................................................. 77 
10. Propensity Score Matching Analysis .......................................................................... 79 
11. Difference-In-Difference Analysis ............................................................................. 81 
12. Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance Robustness Tests:
Performance Over Five Years and Additional Control Variables .............................. 84 
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The practice of issuing quarterly earnings guidance has generated controversy for 
more than a decade. Whereas economic theory suggests that quarterly earnings guidance 
can benefit a firm by decreasing information asymmetry (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Coller 
and Yohn 1997), signaling high managerial ability (Trueman 1986; Baik, Farber, and Lee 
2011), and reducing litigation risk (Skinner 1994; Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005), critics 
argue that quarterly earnings guidance encourages managers to sacrifice long-term value 
to meet short-term earnings expectations (e.g., Buffett 2000; Fink 2016). Embodying the 
latter view, CEOs Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon write in a recent letter, “… we are 
encouraging all public companies to consider moving away from providing quarterly 
earnings-per-share guidance. In our experience, quarterly earnings guidance often leads 
to an unhealthy focus on short-term profits at the expense of long-term strategy, growth, 
and sustainability,” (Buffett and Dimon 2018). In this study, I provide evidence on the 
issue by examining whether firms that provide quarterly earnings guidance appear to be 
more concerned with short-term financial results and exhibit lower long-term 
performance than their non-guiding counterparts. 
Although prominent business leaders have popularized the view that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads to a myopic focus on short-term performance—and have urged 
public companies to forgo the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance based on 
that view—there is little empirical evidence to support their claims. Houston, Lev, and 
Tucker (2010) examine the consequences of stopping quarterly earnings guidance and 
find no evidence that firms that abandon the practice increase their investments in R&D 
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or capital expenditures. In a related study, Call, Chen, and Miao (2014) find that the 
provision of quarterly earnings guidance is associated with less accrual-based earnings 
management. Each of these findings is inconsistent with the claim that quarterly earnings 
guidance leads to managerial myopia. However, the strategies that a myopic manager 
uses to shift value from the long term to the short term may not be detected by the 
measures used in these studies. More importantly, it is unclear based on these studies 
whether the provision of quarterly earnings guidance is value-decreasing in the long term, 
as prominent business leaders contend. 
By definition, managerial myopia exists when a manager sacrifices long-term 
value to meet short-term goals (Porter 1992). Quarterly earnings guidance, in particular, 
has been described as leading to an “unhealthy” focus on meeting short-term earnings 
expectations (e.g., Buffett 2000; Buffett and Dimon 2018).1 Critics argue that this short-
term focus leads to a value-decreasing allocation of resources. Accordingly, to improve 
our understanding of the relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and 
managerial myopia, I examine (1) whether quarterly earnings guidance heightens a 
manager’s focus on short-term earnings, and (2) whether quarterly earnings guidance 
detracts from a firm’s long-term performance. In supplementary tests, I also examine the 
claims of prominent business leaders that quarterly earnings guidance increases earnings 
management and underinvestment. My research therefore provides evidence on the 
effects of quarterly earnings guidance that is relevant to regulators, investors, and the 
academic research community. 
 
1 For instance, Buffett and Dimon (2018) write, “[Quarterly guiders] frequently hold back on technology 
spending, hiring, and research and development to meet quarterly earnings forecasts that may be affected 
by factors outside the company’s control, such as commodity-price fluctuations, stock-market volatility, 
and even the weather.” 
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The provision of quarterly earnings guidance could, in theory, have opposing 
effects on a manager’s focus and a firm’s long-term performance. On the one hand, 
quarterly earnings guidance could lead to managerial myopia, as is argued by critics of 
the practice. A manager who issues quarterly earnings guidance must expend 
considerable time and resources to generate a high-quality forecast (Hui and Matsunaga 
2015). The resulting fixation on quarterly earnings could implicitly shift a manager’s 
focus to the short term, at the cost of developing profitable long-term strategies (Ocasio 
1997). In addition, managers maintain that the consequences of missing the analyst 
consensus forecast are worse when they issue earnings guidance (Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005). There is also evidence that inaccurate earnings guidance increases the 
probability of CEO turnover (Lee, Matsunaga, and Park 2012) and lowers CEO 
compensation (Hui and Matsunaga 2015). As a result of these agency conflicts, quarterly 
guiders may be more willing to take actions to avoid missing short-term earnings 
expectations, even when those actions entail a loss of firm value (e.g., Buffett and Dimon 
2018). 
On the other hand, quarterly earnings guidance could alleviate managerial 
myopia. By allowing a manager to influence analysts’ forecasts of the firm’s future 
earnings (Matsumoto 2002), quarterly earnings guidance may relieve the pressure on a 
manager to meet analysts’ (unguided) short-term earnings expectations. For instance, 
using quarterly earnings guidance to walk the analyst consensus forecast down to a 
beatable level may enable a manager to apply her limited attention to developing 
strategies that improve the firm’s long-term performance, rather than managing the firm’s 
quarterly earnings to meet analysts’ expectations. Thus, managers who issue quarterly 
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earnings guidance may actually be more focused on long-term earnings and report better 
long-term performance. 
It is also possible that quarterly earnings guidance could increase a manager’s 
focus on short-term financial results without detracting from the firm’s long-term value. 
For example, even if quarterly earnings guidance leads a manager to fixate on the firm’s 
quarterly earnings, the benefits that the practice adds to firm value may still outweigh the 
costs. There is evidence that earnings guidance decreases information asymmetry (e.g., 
Ajinkya and Gift 1984), signals high managerial ability (e.g., Trueman 1986), and 
reduces litigation risk (e.g., Skinner 1994). Each of these effects should contribute 
positively to a firm’s long-term performance. By reducing information asymmetry, 
quarterly earnings guidance may decrease a firm’s cost of capital (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007). This could improve a firm’s 
long-term performance by expanding the set of profitable investment opportunities 
available to the firm. Signaling high managerial ability could likewise improve a firm’s 
long-term performance by enabling the firm to attract capital at a lower rate. Last, 
reducing litigation risk could improve a firm’s long-term performance by preventing 
expensive lawsuits and settlements, and enabling the firm to take on riskier projects. 
Quarterly earnings guidance may therefore induce a short-term focus while 
simultaneously improving the firm’s long-term performance.  
To examine whether quarterly guiders exhibit signs of managerial myopia, I use 
data from 2001 to 2018 to generate a sample of 62,856 firm-quarter observations that 
spans the period from 2003 to 2015. I use entropy balancing to improve the similarity of 
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the covariate distributions between the quarterly guiders and non-guiders in my sample.2 
This procedure does not resolve self-selection bias that arises from unobservable 
differences; however, similar to matching methods, it should address self-selection bias 
that is driven by observable factors, and reduce model dependency in the OLS 
regressions that I use to test my hypotheses (Hainmueller 2012; Shipman, Swanquist, and 
Whited 2017). After reweighting my sample via entropy balancing, quarterly guiders and 
non-guiders are statistically indistinguishable across a broad array of firm characteristics, 
including size, analyst following, and institutional ownership. To further reduce 
endogeneity concerns, I focus my analyses on firms that provide earnings guidance for a 
minimum of twelve consecutive quarters (quarterly guiders), and firms that do not 
provide earnings guidance for a minimum of twelve consecutive quarters (non-guiders). 
To the extent that these firms establish their earnings guidance policies in advance 
(Quinto, Matsunaga, and Tang 2019), their past decision to issue quarterly earnings 
guidance is decoupled from events in the current quarter. Collectively, this research 
design should help to mitigate concerns that my results are driven by correlated omitted 
variables.3  
I begin by investigating the claim that quarterly earnings guidance increases a 
manager’s focus on short-term performance. Consistent with this view, I find that relative 
 
2 Entropy balancing is a preprocessing procedure that involves a reweighting scheme. Specifically, a scalar 
weight is assigned to each observation such that differences in the covariate distributions of treatment and 
control groups are reduced or eliminated over a (potentially large) set of variables (Hainmueller 2012). 
 
3 As a robustness test, I repeat my analyses using a propensity-score matched sample of quarterly guiders 
and non-guiders to examine whether my results are sensitive to the use of entropy balancing. I also estimate 
difference-in-difference specifications to examine the impact of initiating quarterly earnings guidance. This 
alternative specification controls for factors that are stable within a firm over time, but it is subject to biases 
generated by the economic factors associated with the decision to initiate quarterly earnings guidance, and 
it is limited to a small sample of initiators. 
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to non-guiders, quarterly guiders are more likely to meet the final analyst consensus 
forecast than the initial analyst consensus forecast for the quarter. Quarterly guiders are 
also more likely than non-guiders to just meet the final analyst consensus forecast than to 
just miss it. Together, these results suggest that quarterly guiders are more likely to take 
actions that increase the likelihood of meeting short-term expectations, which is 
consistent with a greater focus on quarterly financial results. I also find that quarterly 
guiders tend to use more short-term language in their corporate disclosures. Specifically, 
using Python to analyze the language in firms’ 10-K filings and conference call 
transcripts, I find that the 10-Ks and conference calls of quarterly guiders include a 
higher ratio of short-term words to long-term words (Brochet, Loumioti, and Serafeim 
2015). Therefore, my textual analysis supports an association between the provision of 
quarterly earnings guidance and greater attention to short-term performance. 
Nevertheless, my results do not support the claim that the provision of quarterly 
earnings guidance has a negative impact on a firm’s long-term performance. I find that 
quarterly guiders outperform non-guiders, both over the next three and five years, with 
regard to their size- and industry-adjusted returns, industry-adjusted asset turnover, and 
industry-adjusted operating cash flows. The differences in industry-adjusted return on 
assets and industry-adjusted sales growth between quarterly guiders and non-guiders are 
statistically insignificant. Thus, my results do not support the claim that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads to a sacrifice of long-term value. Instead, they are more 
consistent with the view that quarterly earnings guidance benefits a firm’s long-term 
performance by reducing information asymmetry, signaling managerial talent, and 
decreasing litigation risk (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Trueman 1986; Skinner 1994). 
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Quarterly earnings guidance could also improve a firm's long-term performance to the 
extent that it enables the manager to meet short-term earnings expectations without 
engaging in value-decreasing earnings management. Specifically, issuance of quarterly 
earnings guidance could provide the manager with the opportunity to walk analysts’ 
earnings expectations down to a beatable level (Matsumoto 2002), thereby enabling the 
manager to meet quarterly earnings expectations without resorting to strategic 
management of the firm’s earnings.  
In additional analyses, I document evidence that is consistent with several of these 
explanations. First, I find that the positive relationship between quarterly earnings 
guidance and long-term performance is stronger when there is greater analyst forecast 
dispersion, suggesting that firms with higher information asymmetry benefit more from 
the provision of quarterly earnings guidance. I also find that firms with higher-ability 
managers benefit more from the provision of quarterly earnings guidance, as the 
relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and long-term performance is stronger 
when managers issue earnings guidance that is more accurate (Baik et al. 2011). I do not 
find evidence of a significant difference in the effect of quarterly earnings guidance on 
long-term performance based on a firm’s inclusion in a high litigation-risk industry 
(Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994; Kim and Skinner 2012). These cross-sectional 
results are consistent with the notion that quarterly earnings guidance improves a firm’s 
long-term performance by reducing information asymmetry and signaling high 
managerial ability, thereby lowering the firm’s cost of capital. 
Second, supporting the view that quarterly earnings guidance reduces the need to 
manage earnings, I find that quarterly guiders report more discretionary R&D expenses 
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than non-guiders. The difference in discretionary SG&A expenses between quarterly 
guiders and non-guiders is statistically insignificant. Unlike Call et al. (2014), I do not 
find a significant difference in the magnitudes of discretionary accruals between quarterly 
guiders and non-guiders. Overall, these results tend to refute the claim that quarterly 
guiders are more likely to engage in earnings management (e.g., Buffett 2000). I also 
investigate the claim that quarterly guiders are more likely to underinvest (e.g., Buffett 
and Dimon 2018). I find evidence that quarterly guiders are less likely to underinvest in 
R&D, whereas there is no significant difference in underinvestment in capital assets or 
M&A between quarterly guiders and non-guiders. These results suggest that quarterly 
guiders may be able to invest more freely as a result of their ability to influence the 
analyst consensus forecast. Collectively, these additional analyses insinuate that quarterly 
guiders may also perform better in the long term because they are able to meet short-term 
earnings expectations without relying on real earnings management. 
Last, I perform tests to examine whether quarterly earnings guidance is 
detrimental to long-term performance when it coincides with other short-term pressures. I 
do not find a significant difference in the impact of quarterly earnings guidance on long-
term performance based on (1) transient institutional ownership, (2) analyst coverage, or 
(3) management’s stock-based compensation. Overall, my results suggest that these 
factors are unlikely to diminish the benefits of quarterly earnings guidance. 
Taken as a whole, my findings are inconsistent with the view that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads a manager to sacrifice long-term value to enhance short-term 
performance. Although I find evidence that quarterly earnings guidance increases a 
manager’s focus on short-term earnings, there is little evidence that the practice detracts 
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from a firm’s long-term performance. In fact, my results suggest that, on average, firms 
that choose to provide quarterly earnings guidance generate better performance in the 
long term. The idea that quarterly earnings guidance is value-increasing among the firms 
that choose to provide it is consistent with the theory of voluntary disclosure proposed by 
Dye (2001). He describes voluntary disclosure as, “… a special case of game theory with 
the following central premise: any entity contemplating making a disclosure will disclose 
information that is favorable to the entity, and will not disclose information unfavorable 
to the entity,” (Dye 2001, p. 184). 
My results are important because prominent business leaders’ claims that 
quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia have received significant 
attention in the business press, and appear to be accepted as conventional wisdom by 
journalists and practitioners (e.g., Pearlstein 2018). A better understanding of the link 
between quarterly earnings guidance and managerial myopia is imperative in light of 
recent policy debates (Rajgopal 2019). In 2018, President Donald Trump proposed that 
the reporting of quarterly earnings be abolished in the United States, spurring a review by 
the SEC of quarterly reporting and quarterly earnings guidance (Rubin 2018; Henderson 
and Edgecliffe-Johnson 2019). Evidence that quarterly earnings guidance appears not to 
lower long-term performance is therefore timely, and has the potential to influence the 
decisions of securities regulators. 
My research also contributes to the earnings guidance literature (Hirst, Koonce, 
and Venkataraman 2008). While a number of studies investigate the benefits of earnings 
guidance (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Trueman 1986; Skinner 1994; Williams 1996), 
there is relatively little research that investigates its costs. By providing empirical 
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evidence on the existence of managerial myopia among quarterly guiders, my study 
provides insights for researchers who seek to understand the consequences of quarterly 
earnings guidance. Research in this area is becoming increasingly relevant, as the 
frequency with which firms issue quarterly earnings guidance appears to be on the rise 
(Grocer 2018). 
Finally, my study contributes to an emerging literature related to the real effects 
of corporate disclosures (Kanodia and Sapra 2016). This research explores how the 
public disclosure of information (that is already known privately by a manager) affects 
her decision-making. Thus, by examining whether issuance of quarterly earnings 
guidance leads a manager to exchange long-term value for short-term performance, my 
research adds to this literature by extending our understanding of the ways in which 
corporate disclosures influence the allocation of a firm’s resources. 
As is common with empirical research, my study is subject to limitations. Most 
importantly, I am unable to observe the counterfactual of how a firm would have 
performed had the manager not decided to provide quarterly earnings guidance. Care 
must therefore be taken in interpreting my results. I also cannot say how issuance of 
quarterly earnings guidance would affect the firms that do not choose to provide it; for 
example, my results do not suggest that all firms should be required to provide quarterly 
earnings guidance because it would improve their long-term performance. However, I am 
able to document how U.S. firms that choose to issue quarterly earnings guidance behave 
relative to an observably similar group of non-guiders. In my main tests, I use entropy 
balancing to ensure that quarterly guiders and non-guiders are comparable with regard to 
their observable features. Cross-sectional tests corroborate my primary findings. 
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Robustness tests reveal that, overall, my inferences remain unchanged when I employ a 
propensity-score matching method, or when I perform a difference-in-difference analysis 
around instances when firms initiate quarterly earnings guidance. Therefore, despite its 
limitations, my research should provide novel evidence that informs the debate 
surrounding quarterly earnings guidance.  
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CHAPTER II 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior Literature 
 Stein (1989) develops a model of myopic corporate behavior, in which a manager 
derives utility from both current and future earnings due to her compensation plan. There 
is an increasing marginal cost of borrowing against future earnings to boost the firm’s 
short-term profits, as it is assumed that the least value-decreasing strategies will be 
pursued first to increase income in the current period. When borrowing costs are zero, the 
firm’s long-term value is maximized. Stein (1989) predicts that a utility-maximizing 
manager will shift value from the long term to the short term when there is capital market 
pressure on current-period earnings (e.g., a takeover threat). To do so, she increases the 
investment hurdle rate and forgoes profitable investment opportunities. For instance, she 
may expend fewer resources to develop customer loyalty. The model of Stein (1989) 
highlights the idea that managerial myopia stems from an agency conflict, where the 
actions that a manager rationally takes to maximize her utility are inconsistent with the 
actions that maximize firm value. Applying the model of Stein (1989) to my setting, the 
question becomes whether quarterly earnings guidance constitutes a source of short-term 
pressure that leads a manager to derive greater utility from current-period earnings. If so, 
it should increase a manager’s willingness to sacrifice long-term value for short-term 
financial results. 
There are several studies that explore the relationship between quarterly earnings 
guidance and managerial myopia. First, Houston et al. (2010) examine a sample of firms 
that discontinue the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance. The authors argue 
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that if quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia, then firms should 
increase their investments in capital assets and R&D after suspending the practice. 
However, counter to this prediction, the authors find no evidence that firms increase their 
investments in the two years after giving up quarterly earnings guidance. Instead, 
Houston et al. (2010) find evidence of a deterioration in the information environments of 
quarterly guiders after earnings guidance is discontinued. Specifically, they find that 
guidance “stoppers” experience a decrease in analyst coverage, an increase in analyst 
forecast dispersion, and an increase in analyst forecast errors. In a related study, Chen, 
Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2011) document a significantly negative market reaction to 
the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance, which suggests that investors view 
discontinuance of the practice as value-decreasing. Taken together, the findings of 
Houston et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) do not support the claim that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia. 
 Call et al. (2014) contribute to the debate by examining whether quarterly guiders 
engage in more accrual-based earnings management. Using a propensity-score matched 
sample of guiders and non-guiders, the authors find that quarterly guiders record fewer 
discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues than non-guiders. They also find that a 
firm’s discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues decrease with the frequency that 
a firm issues quarterly earnings guidance. The results of Call et al. (2014) are therefore 
inconsistent with prominent business leaders’ claims that quarterly earnings guidance 
promotes the use of accrual-based earnings management (e.g., Buffett 2000). 
 Although these existing studies provide evidence on the link between quarterly 
earnings guidance and managerial myopia, they do not directly address whether quarterly 
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guiders sacrifice long-term value to meet short-term earnings expectations. It is therefore 
unclear whether quarterly earnings guidance is problematic in that it detracts from a 
firm’s long-term performance, as is asserted by critics. In addition, these studies may not 
find evidence of managerial myopia if managers shift resources from long-term growth to 
short-term profitability using strategies that are not detected by traditional earnings 
management measures. To this point, Stein (1989, p. 664) predicts, “It is precisely those 
investments that are most easily and accurately summarized on an accounting 
statement—e.g., expenditures on plant and equipment—which are least likely to be 
sacrificed in the quest for higher stock prices.” To expand our understanding of the 
relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and managerial myopia, I therefore 
consider how the provision of quarterly earnings guidance impacts a firm’s long-term 
performance, as well as a manager’s focus on short-term financial results.4,5 
Hypothesis Development 
Prior literature suggests that earnings guidance has the potential to yield a number 
of benefits for a firm and its managers. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) find that earnings 
 
4 Several unpublished studies report additional evidence that is inconsistent with the claim that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia; however, these studies are subject to the same limitations as 
other prior research. They include Acito (2011), who finds no statistical relation between quarterly earnings 
guidance and accounting restatements; Chen, Huang, and Lao (2015), who find that quarterly earnings 
guidance is associated with more innovation (more patents and patent citations); and Call, Chen, Esplin, 
and Miao (2016), who find no statistical difference in investment levels between firms that issue short-term 
earnings guidance and firms that issue long-term earnings guidance. One notable exception is Cheng, 
Subramanyam, and Zhang (2005), who find support for the claim that quarterly earnings guidance leads to 
managerial myopia. The authors report that relative to “infrequent” guiders, “frequent” guiders invest less 
in R&D, meet or beat the analyst consensus forecast more frequently, and have lower long-term earnings 
growth rates. However, their sample is limited to the period of 2001 to 2003, when fewer firms provided 
quarterly earnings guidance and the earnings guidance databases contained more errors (Chuk, Matsumoto, 
and Miller 2013). 
 
5 Kim, Su, and Zhu (2017) take a somewhat different approach by examining whether quarterly earnings 
guidance leads to short-termism among investors. The authors find evidence that stopping the practice of 
providing quarterly earnings guidance reduces investors’ short-termism, e.g., their results suggest that 
investors put more weight on long-term earnings in firm valuations after the cessation of quarterly earnings 
guidance. 
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guidance aligns the market’s earnings expectations with those of the manager, as the 
market responds positively (negatively) to earnings guidance that contains good (bad) 
news. In a related study, Coller and Yohn (1997) find evidence that earnings guidance 
decreases a firm’s bid-ask spread. These studies suggest that by aligning the market’s 
earnings expectations with those of the manager, earnings guidance reduces information 
asymmetry. Earnings guidance may therefore increase firm value by lowering the firm’s 
cost of capital, either by improving the liquidity of the firm’s stock (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991), or by decreasing the expected covariance between the firm’s cash 
flows and market-wide cash flows (Lambert et al. 2007). 
Trueman (1986) provides a different view, arguing that because the firm’s actual 
earnings are reported at the end of the period, the temporary corrections of mispricing 
provided by earnings guidance may not have a significant effect on a firm’s cost of 
capital. Instead, he proposes that managers issue earnings guidance to signal high 
managerial ability. To generate an accurate forecast of the firm’s future earnings, a 
manager must have the ability to accurately anticipate future economic events and assess 
their impact on the firm’s earnings. The same ability is fundamental to successful 
management of the firm’s operations. Thus, issuance of earnings guidance may function 
as a credible signal of managerial ability, as a low-ability manager is unable to mimic the 
signal. Trueman (1986) concludes that quarterly earnings guidance may therefore be 
issued to increase firm value through its signaling capabilities. 
Skinner (1994) predicts that bad-news earnings guidance is beneficial in that it 
reduces litigation costs by revealing negative information prior to the earnings 
announcement date. This prevents large declines in stock price on earnings 
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announcement days (which could prompt lawsuits), and makes it more difficult for a 
plaintiff to argue that the manager withheld unfavorable information from investors. 
Consistent with his prediction, Skinner (1994) finds that earnings guidance precedes large 
negative earnings announcements about 25 percent of the time, whereas earnings 
guidance precedes other earnings announcements less than ten percent of the time. This 
evidence suggests that earnings guidance can increase firm value by warding off 
expensive lawsuits and settlements. It may also enable the firm to pursue riskier projects, 
as there is less concern that a negative outcome will trigger litigation. 
Despite these potential benefits, issuance of quarterly earnings guidance remains 
highly controversial. Prominent business leaders have urged public companies to 
discontinue the practice, asserting that quarterly earnings guidance leads managers to 
sacrifice long-term value in exchange for short-term profits (e.g., Buffett 2000; Fink 
2016). It could be the case that quarterly earnings guidance increases a manager’s focus 
on short-term financial results at the cost of long-term value, as issuance of a forecast 
requires a substantial investment of time and resources (Hui and Matsunaga 2015). The 
effort a manager dedicates to producing a high-quality forecast could increase her interest 
in the firm’s short-term performance, and contemporaneously decrease the attention she 
devotes to crafting profitable long-term strategies. Such a shift in focus may therefore 
detract from the firm’s long-term performance. This is consistent with research in the 
management literature, which describes a manager’s focus as being selective, where 
attention to one activity necessarily subtracts from the attention available for another 
(e.g., Ocasio 1997). Quarterly guiders may also be more likely to give up long-term value 
to meet short-term earnings expectations because they believe that the consequences of 
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missing the analyst consensus forecast are worse when they issue earnings guidance. For 
example, executives surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) indicate that they are more likely 
to be questioned about missing the analyst consensus forecast during the conference call 
when they have issued earnings guidance. Last, Lee et al. (2012) and Hui and Matsunaga 
(2015) find that managers face career concerns when the firm’s actual earnings deviate 
from their earnings guidance. Specifically, Lee et al. (2012) find a positive relationship 
between management forecast errors and CEO turnover when the firm’s performance is 
poor, and Hui and Matsunaga (2015) find a positive relationship between management 
forecast accuracy and CEO compensation. This suggests that managers can bear 
substantial costs when they issue inaccurate earnings guidance, including turnover and 
lower pay. These career concerns may contribute to agency conflicts where quarterly 
guiders are overly focused on meeting short-term earnings expectations. 
However, one could also argue that quarterly earnings guidance alleviates 
managerial myopia. Quarterly guiders tend to be large firms with sizeable analyst 
followings and high institutional ownership (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005). 
Such firms are likely to be under considerable pressure to meet short-term earnings 
expectations. Thus, the ability to issue quarterly earnings guidance could provide the 
manager with the opportunity to walk earnings expectations down to a beatable level 
(Matsumoto 2002), thereby enabling the manager to meet quarterly earnings expectations 
without resorting to strategic management of the firm’s earnings. Quarterly earnings 
guidance may therefore improve a firm's long-term performance to the extent that it 
enables the manager to meet short-term earnings expectations without engaging in value-
decreasing earnings management. It may also allow management to adopt more of a long-
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term focus, as the managers of quarterly guiders may have greater latitude to take value-
maximizing actions without concern that those actions will cause the firm to miss short-
term earnings expectations. 
It is also possible that quarterly earnings guidance could increase a manager’s 
attention to short-term financial results while also improving the firm’s long-term 
performance. This could occur if quarterly earnings guidance increases a manager’s focus 
on short-term performance, but the benefits that the practice adds to firm value exceed 
the costs. As discussed in the preceding paragraph, quarterly earnings guidance may 
improve a firm’s long-term performance by enabling the manager to meet short-term 
earnings expectations without indulging in value-decreasing earnings management. In 
addition, quarterly earnings guidance may improve long-term performance due to its 
capacity to reduce information asymmetry, signal high managerial ability, and decrease 
litigation risk (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Trueman 1986; Skinner 1994). Reducing 
information asymmetry or signaling high managerial ability could improve long-term 
performance by allowing the firm to attract capital at a lower rate, thereby expanding the 
firm’s set of profitable investment opportunities. Decreasing litigation risk may also 
improve long-term performance by lowering the firm’s litigation-related expenses and 
enabling the firm to take on riskier projects. Due to these benefits, the choice to issue 
quarterly earnings guidance could be value-enhancing, even if the practice leads to a 
greater focus on short-term earnings. 
These arguments lead me to delineate two hypotheses related to quarterly 
earnings guidance and managerial myopia. First, I hypothesize that there is no difference 
in the extent to which quarterly guiders and non-guiders focus on short-term earnings. 
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Second, I hypothesize that there is no difference in long-term performance between 
quarterly guiders and non-guiders. I state each of my hypotheses in null form because the 
preceding arguments illustrate that the relationship between quarterly earnings guidance 
and managerial myopia is theoretically ambiguous.  
H1: There is no difference in the extent to which quarterly guiders and non-
guiders focus on short-term earnings. 
H2: There is no difference in long-term performance between quarterly guiders 
and non-guiders.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection 
My sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 1. I begin with 306,701 
firm-quarter observations obtained from the merged CRSP-Compustat database, spanning 
the period from 2003 to 2015.6 CRSP supplies stock return data and Compustat provides 
accounting data. I obtain analyst and management forecast data from the I/B/E/S 
database, and I collect institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters. Utility firms 
(SIC 4900-4949) and financial services firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded from my 
sample because the earnings management incentives for these types of firms are likely to 
differ from those for other firms (e.g., Call et al. 2014). I also exclude observations that 
are missing variables necessary to perform my tests. 
As a final exclusion criterion, I remove from my sample all observations that do 
not satisfy either my “quarterly guider” or “non-guider” definitions, resulting in an 
unbalanced panel dataset consisting of 62,856 firm-quarter observations. I define a 
“quarterly guider” as a firm that provides earnings guidance for every quarter over a 
minimum of twelve consecutive quarters. Conversely, a “non-guider” is a firm that does 
not provide earnings guidance for any quarter over a minimum of twelve consecutive 
quarters. Effectively, this eliminates firms that provide quarterly earnings guidance 
sporadically (for some quarters but not others) from my sample.7 Quinto et al. (2019) find 
 
6 I require additional data from 2001 to 2003 and 2016 to 2018 to identify quarterly guiders and non-
guiders, estimate control variables, and measure long-term performance. Data prior to 2001 is omitted from 
my sample to avoid the influence of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which was passed in October 2000. 
 
7 In recent years, about 75 percent of quarterly earnings guidance is provided by firms that issue earnings 
guidance for every quarter over a minimum of twelve consecutive quarters (Quinto et al. 2019); thus, I 
retain the majority of quarterly earnings guidance observations by imposing this restriction.  
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evidence that some firms follow predetermined earnings guidance policies, while other 
firms make individual earnings guidance decisions on a quarter-to-quarter basis. 
Focusing on the former group is advantageous in my setting because, for these firms, the 
decision to issue quarterly earnings guidance is largely decoupled from the current 
quarter. This helps to reduce the risk that my results are driven by quarter-specific 
earnings guidance incentives. For example, Quinto et al. (2019) find that sporadic 
quarterly guiders tend to issue forecasts in quarters when the firm’s actual earnings fall 
short of analysts’ initial expectations. One could therefore argue that sporadic quarterly 
guiders are more likely to underinvest in earnings guidance quarters because they tend to 
issue earnings guidance in the quarters when performance is poor—not because quarterly 
earnings guidance makes them myopic. It is more difficult to make such arguments with 
respect to firms that issue earnings guidance for every quarter, as it suggests that their 
earnings guidance decisions are less sensitive to conditions that prevail in a particular 
quarter. 
If quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia, the effect should be 
stronger for firms that provide regular earnings guidance for every quarter. An executive 
interviewed by Graham et al. (2005) likens the establishment of such a disclosure policy 
to “getting on a treadmill” that you cannot get off (Graham et al. 2005, p. 59). 
Consequently, the managers of firms that issue earnings guidance for every quarter are 
likely to feel compelled to issue forecasts even when earnings are highly uncertain, and 
be more willing to sacrifice long-term value to meet short-term earnings expectations as a 
result. A greater focus on short-term earnings would allow such managers to enhance 
their personal reputations (Lee et al. 2012; Hui and Matsunaga 2015) and reduce pressure 
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from analysts (Graham et al. 2005). In addition, issuance of earnings guidance for every 
quarter should consume more of a manager’s attention than issuance of sporadic quarterly 
earnings guidance, leaving less of the manager’s attention available other purposes, such 
as long-term planning. Thus, I consider my analyses to focus on the firms that are most 
subject to the claims of critics. This should increase the power of my tests to link the 
provision of quarterly earnings guidance to managerial myopia.8 
Entropy Balancing 
Prior research shows that quarterly guiders differ from non-guiders along a 
number of dimensions. For example, quarterly guiders tend to be larger, more profitable 
firms with greater institutional ownership and analyst following (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 
2005). Thus, any differences in myopic behavior between quarterly guiders and non-
guiders could reflect factors that jointly determine the firm’s provision of earnings 
guidance and the economic outcomes of interest. To reduce this bias, I apply entropy 
balancing to my sample of quarterly guiders and non-guiders. While this procedure does 
not correct for unidentified factors that contribute to a firm’s earnings guidance decisions, 
it should reduce the influence of observable factors that are associated with the provision 
of quarterly earnings guidance, and make my results less sensitive to research design 
choices, i.e., reduce model dependency (Hainmueller 2012). In this sense, entropy 
balancing is similar to matching procedures (Shipman et al. 2017).9 
 
8 In Appendix B, I present descriptive statistics that compare (1) quarterly guiders to sporadic quarterly 
guiders, and (2) quarterly guiders to non-guiders to illustrate the differences in firm fundamentals between 
the three groups of firms. The table generally depicts a gradient where the mean for sporadic quarterly 
guiders falls between the mean for quarterly guiders and the mean for non-guiders. For example, on 
average, there are about ten analysts following quarterly guiders, eight analysts following sporadic 
quarterly guiders, and six analysts following non-guiders. 
 
9 Because quarterly guiders are significantly different from non-guiders across many fundamental firm 
characteristics, it is difficult to specify effective matching criteria. In contrast, entropy balancing enables 
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Hainmueller (2012) describes entropy balancing as a method of obtaining 
covariate balance between treatment and control observations. By reweighting the 
sampled observations, entropy balancing can be used to reduce or eliminate differences 
between treatment and control observations across a wide array of variables. Specifically, 
a set of scalar weights is chosen such that differences in the covariate distributions 
between quarterly guiders and non-guiders are minimized, where the weights are kept as 
close as possible to a set of uniform base weights to preserve efficiency (Hainmueller 
2012). 
I balance my sample of quarterly guiders and non-guiders on the first, second, and 
third moments of each of the firm characteristics listed in Panel A of Table 2, as well as 
industry (2-digit SIC code) and year-quarter. In addition to firm fundamentals such as 
market value of equity, book-to-market ratio, and leverage, I balance on factors that prior 
research has shown to predict the provision of earnings guidance. First, I include the bid-
ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion because there is evidence that earnings 
guidance is issued to reduce information asymmetry (e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997). I 
include return volatility and an indicator variable for high-litigation risk industries 
because prior research suggests that earnings guidance is issued to lower litigation risk 
(e.g., Skinner 1994). I also include analyst following and institutional ownership because 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) show that these factors are positively related to the provision of 
earnings guidance. I partition a firm’s institutional ownership by transient, quasi-indexer, 
and dedicated institutional investors because there is evidence that disclosure quality 
increases (decreases) with transient and quasi-indexer (dedicated) institutional ownership 
 
me to retain my full sample of quarterly earnings guidance observations while achieving a high degree of 
covariate balance between quarterly guiders and non-guiders. 
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(Bushee and Noe 2000). I include managerial ability scores (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 
2012) because high-ability managers may be more likely to provide quarterly earnings 
guidance (e.g., Baik et al. 2011). Last, I balance on firm life cycle and several measures 
of profitability because Miller (2002) shows that firms’ disclosure choices are linked to 
their financial performance. A number of these variables (e.g., market value of equity, 
life cycle) should address the concern that firms with better internal information 
environments are more likely to provide quarterly earnings guidance.10 
After I perform entropy balancing, the quarterly guiders and non-guiders in my 
sample are statistically indistinguishable across each of the firm characteristics on which 
I balance. The weights generated by this entropy balancing procedure are applied to each 
of my subsequent regressions. I present the results of my entropy balancing procedure in 
Panel A of Table 2, and I provide descriptive statistics related to my entropy balancing 
weights in Panel E of Table 2.11 
Model Specification and Measurement of Key Variables 
To test my first hypothesis, which states that there is no difference in the extent to 
which quarterly guiders and non-guiders focus on short-term earnings, I begin by 
estimating the following regression: 
 
10 To gauge the effectiveness of these variables in distinguishing quarterly guiders from non-guiders, I 
estimate a logistic regression where the dependent variable is an indicator variable set equal to one (zero) 
for quarterly guiders (non-guiders), and the variables listed in Panel A of Table 2 are included as 
determinants. The results are reported in Table 3. The regression yields an area under the ROC curve of 
0.83, suggesting that these variables are effective in predicting firms’ quarterly earnings guidance 
decisions. 
 
11 Each of the 11,494 quarterly guider observations included in my sample receives a weight of one. The 
51,362 non-guider observations are weighted between 0.000 (1st percentile) and 1.591 (99th percentile) such 
that the sum of their weights is equal to 11,494. By design, the mean of the weights for non-guiders is 
11,494 ÷ 51,362 = 0.224. This follows the standard implementation of entropy balancing developed by 
Hainmueller (2012). 
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𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where i indexes firms, t indexes year-quarters, and s indexes 2-digit SIC industries. I first 
replace Outcome with MeetFinal, which is an indicator variable set equal to one when 
firm i’s actual earnings meet or beat the final analyst consensus forecast for quarter t, and 
zero otherwise. Guider is an indicator variable set equal to one when firm i provides 
earnings guidance for every quarter over a minimum of twelve consecutive quarters, and 
zero when firm i does not provide earnings guidance for any quarter over a minimum of 
twelve consecutive quarters. I include controls for each of the firm characteristics listed 
in Panel A of Table 2. Additionally, I include industry (2-digit SIC) and year-quarter 
fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors by firm and year-quarter (Petersen 2009). I 
also apply the weights from my entropy balancing procedure. A positive coefficient on 
Guider would be consistent with quarterly guiders meeting the final analyst consensus 
forecast with greater frequency than non-guiders, supporting the view that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads to a greater fixation on short-term performance. 
Next, I use Python to conduct a textual analysis of firms’ 10-K filings as an 
alternative test of my first hypothesis. I begin by replacing the dependent variable in 
Equation (1) with the sum of short-term 10-K words divided by the sum of short- and 
long-term 10-K words (10-K:St÷Lt). I define short-term 10-K words as “short-term” and 
“short-run” as well as their derivatives. Long-term 10-K words are analogously defined. I 
also replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) with the sum of long-term view words 
divided by the total number of 10-K words (10-K:%LtView). I develop a dictionary of 
long-term view words based on the letters of Fink (2016) and Buffett and Dimon (2018). 
My dictionary includes words such as “firm value”, “sustainability”, and “environment”. 
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For complete details on the construction of these variables, see the variable definitions in 
Appendix A. 
My textual analysis is inspired by Brochet et al. (2015), who use a sample of 
conference call transcripts to show that the language contained in a firm’s corporate 
disclosures can be used to generate a reliable measure of managerial short-termism. 
Based on their work, I expect that if quarterly earnings guidance leads a manager to focus 
on short-term financial results, the coefficient on Guider will be positive when the 
dependent variable is 10-K:St÷Lt, and negative when the dependent variable is 10-
K:%LtView. This would be consistent with quarterly guiders providing more discussion 
about short-term performance, or less discussion about long-term strategy, in their 
corporate disclosures than non-guiders. 
Last, I collect conference call transcripts from Capital IQ for the largest 100 firms 
in my sample (based on market value of equity at the end of each fiscal year). This hand-
collection process yields a sample of 3,275 quarterly conference call transcripts.12 I use 
Python to analyze these conference call transcripts and replicate the measure of short-
termism developed by Brochet et al. (2015), denoted as ConfCall:St÷Lt. When this 
measure is used as the dependent variable in Equation (1), a positive coefficient on 
Guider would be consistent with quarterly guiders discussing more short-term matters 
during their conference calls than non-guiders. Although this analysis is limited to a 
smaller sample of firms, it is an informative supplementary test because of the extensive 
work that Brochet et al. (2015) have done to validate ConfCall:St÷Lt as a measure of 
managerial short-termism. 
 
12 Conference calls are sometimes missing from the Capital IQ database. In particular, I find that very few 
conference calls are available in Capital IQ for years prior to 2007. 
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To test my second hypothesis, which states that there is no difference in long-term 
performance between quarterly guiders and non-guiders, I successively replace the 
dependent variable in Equation (1) with five alternative measures of long-term 
performance: size- and industry-adjusted returns, industry-adjusted return on assets, 
industry-adjusted asset turnover, industry-adjusted sales growth, and industry-adjusted 
operating cash flows. Each of these measures is calculated over quarters t to t+11. To 
calculate industry-adjusted performance, I subtract the median performance in firm i’s 2-
digit SIC industry from firm i’s performance over the same period. These five measures 
capture different facets of a firm’s long-term performance. Return on assets and asset 
turnover are ex post accounting-based measures that signify a firm’s ability to generate 
profits and operate efficiently. Operating cash flows are an alternative measure of 
accounting performance that is not influenced by accruals. In contrast, returns are an ex 
ante market-based measure that reflect changes in investors’ perceptions of firm value. 
Last, sales growth captures the extent to which a firm grows over time. A negative 
coefficient on Guider would be consistent with critics’ claims that quarterly earnings 
guidance leads to a sacrifice of long-term value, as it would suggest that quarterly guiders 
underperform relative to non-guiders in the long term.  
 
28 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
I tabulate descriptive statistics for my sample of quarterly guiders and non-guiders 
in Table 2. Consistent with prior research, in the first three columns of Panel A, I find 
that quarterly guiders are different from non-guiders with regard to many of their firm 
characteristics. However, none of these differences remain statistically significant after I 
reweight my sample using entropy balancing, as shown in the last three columns of Panel 
A. The descriptive statistics in Panels B and C are consistent with quarterly earnings 
guidance increasing a manager’s attention to short-term earnings, as they show that 
quarterly guiders are more likely to meet the final analyst consensus forecast for the 
quarter, and tend to use more short-term language in their 10-Ks and conference calls. 
Last, Panel D shows that over the next three years, quarterly guiders outperform non-
guiders with regard to their size- and industry-adjusted returns, industry-adjusted return 
on assets, industry-adjusted asset turnover, and industry-adjusted operating cash flows. 
There is no statistical difference in industry-adjusted sales growth between quarterly 
guiders and non-guiders. Overall, these descriptive statistics provide initial evidence that 
quarterly earnings guidance increases a manager’s attention to short-term financial 
results; however, they do not support critics’ claims that quarterly earnings guidance 
detracts from a firm’s long-term performance. 
Determinants of Quarterly Earnings Guidance 
In Table 3, I estimate a logistic regression to examine the determinants of 
quarterly earnings guidance. Specifically, I regress Guider on the variables listed in Panel 
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A of Table 2, which are used both for entropy balancing and as control variables in my 
subsequent analyses. I also include industry (2-digit SIC) and year-quarter fixed effects, 
and cluster the standard errors by firm. The results in Table 3 are useful for at least two 
reasons. First, they show that the variables listed in Panel A of Table 2 are effective in 
predicting firms’ quarterly earnings guidance decisions, as evidenced by an area under 
the ROC curve of 0.83. This helps to mitigate concerns that my findings are driven by 
correlated omitted variables or functional form misspecification. 
Second, the results in Table 3 provide a better understanding of the firms that 
choose to issue quarterly earnings guidance. Notably, the marginal effects presented in 
Column (2) show that the probability of providing quarterly earnings guidance is 13.62 
percent greater when analyst coverage increases from the first to the third quartile of its 
distribution. Consistent with prior literature, the results in Table 3 also suggest that there 
is a negative relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and information 
asymmetry, and a positive relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and 
institutional ownership. It appears that quarterly guiders are also more likely than non-
guiders to be in either the growth phase or mature phase of their life cycles, and to be 
members of high litigation-risk industries. 
Primary Analyses 
In Table 4, I present results related to my first hypothesis, which predicts that 
there is no difference in the extent to which quarterly guiders and non-guiders focus on 
short-term earnings. In Column (1), where the dependent variable is MeetFinal, I find a 
significantly positive coefficient on Guider (t-statistic = 14.70). The coefficient of 0.119 
indicates that quarterly guiders are about 17.12 percent more likely than non-guiders to 
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meet the final analyst consensus forecast for the quarter (0.119 ÷ 0.695 = 0.171). This 
result is consistent with quarterly guiders being more focused on meeting short-term 
earnings expectations than non-guiders.13 
However, such a result could also be explained by quarterly guiders exhibiting 
strong performance that legitimately exceeds analysts’ expectations. To differentiate 
between these competing explanations, in Column (2), I replace the dependent variable 
with an indicator variable that is set equal to one when firm i’s actual earnings meet or 
beat the initial analyst consensus forecast for quarter t, and zero otherwise (MeetInitial).14 
I then use a χ2 test to test whether the coefficient on Guider (β1) is equal in Columns (1) 
and (2). If β1 is larger when the dependent variable is MeetFinal than when it is 
MeetInitial, it would suggest that quarterly earnings guidance has a greater impact on the 
firm’s propensity to meet the final analyst consensus forecast, relative to its impact on the 
firm’s propensity to meet the initial analyst consensus forecast. This would be consistent 
with quarterly guiders strategically walking analysts’ earnings expectations down to a 
beatable level. On the other hand, if β1 is not significantly different between Columns (1) 
and (2), it would suggest that quarterly guiders are more likely than non-guiders to meet 
the final analyst consensus forecast as a result of strong performance. 
The results show that β1 is 0.043 in Column (2), whereas β1 is 0.119 in Column 
(1). A χ2 test reveals that β1 is significantly larger in Column (1) than in Column (2) (p-
value = 0.00). Thus, although the significantly positive β1 in Column (2) suggests that 
 
13 The results in Table 4 are similar when I estimate binary logit models rather than estimating linear 
probability models using OLS. I present the results of OLS regressions for ease of interpretation. 
 
14 The initial analyst consensus forecast is estimated at the beginning of quarter t, prior to the manager’s 
issuance of earnings guidance for quarter t. 
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quarterly guiders are about 7.66 percent more likely than non-guiders to meet the initial 
analyst consensus forecast (0.043 ÷ 0.561 = 0.077; t-statistic = 4.77), the results of the χ2 
test indicate that this increase is dwarfed by the 17.12 percent increase in quarterly 
guiders’ propensity to meet the final analyst consensus forecast. Overall, these results 
suggest that quarterly guiders walk the initial analyst consensus forecast down to a 
beatable level, and that strong performance only partially explains the increased 
frequency with which quarterly guiders meet short-term earnings expectations.15 
One could also argue that quarterly guiders are more likely than non-guiders to 
meet the final analyst consensus forecast because quarterly earnings guidance is issued to 
reduce information asymmetry. If this were the case, I would expect to find that quarterly 
earnings guidance improves analysts’ forecast accuracy in an unbiased manner. In other 
words, there should be no difference between quarterly guiders and non-guiders with 
regard to their propensity to just meet the final analyst consensus forecast as opposed to 
just miss it. I therefore estimate two additional specifications in Columns (3) and (4) 
where I replace the dependent variable with an indicator variable that is set equal to one 
when firm i’s actual earnings for quarter t positively (negatively) deviate from the final 
analyst consensus forecast by a penny or less, and zero otherwise; denoted as JustMeet 
(JustMiss). Again, I use a χ2 test to test whether β1 is equal across the two specifications. 
If β1 is larger when the dependent variable is JustMeet than when it is JustMiss, it would 
 
15 As an alternative test, I repeat the analysis shown in Column (1) of Table 4 and add MeetInitial as a 
control variable. MeetInitial controls for the strength of the firm’s performance relative to analysts’ initial 
(unguided) expectations. I find that the coefficient on Guider remains significantly positive (t-statistic = 
15.61). Economically, the coefficient of 0.101 on Guider suggests that quarterly guiders are about 14.35 
percent more likely than non-guiders to meet the final analyst consensus forecast for the quarter, after 
controlling for whether the firm meets the initial analyst consensus forecast for the quarter (0.101 ÷ 0.704 = 
0.143). Thus, this alternative specification provides additional evidence that quarterly guiders’ increased 
propensity to meet the final analyst consensus forecast cannot be explained solely by strong performance. 
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suggest that quarterly guiders strategically avoid missing the final analyst consensus 
forecast. On the other hand, if β1 is not significantly different between Columns (3) and 
(4), it would be consistent with quarterly earnings guidance being issued to reduce 
information asymmetry. 
 In Column (3), I find that quarterly guiders are about 34.42 percent more likely 
than non-guiders to just meet the final analyst consensus forecast (0.053 ÷ 0.154 = 0.344; 
t-statistic = 5.81). However, in Column (4), I do not find a significant difference in the 
probability of just missing the final analyst consensus forecast between quarterly guiders 
and non-guiders (t-statistic = 1.38). A χ2 test formalizes the result that β1 is significantly 
larger in Column (3) than in Column (4) (p-value = 0.00). Consequently, it does not 
appear that quarterly guiders’ increased propensity to meet the final analyst consensus 
forecast can be fully explained by quarterly earnings guidance being issued to reduce 
information asymmetry.16 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 are consistent with quarterly earnings 
guidance increasing a manager’s attention to short-term financial results. Column (1) 
shows that quarterly guiders are more likely than non-guiders to meet the final analyst 
 
16 It is important to note that, individually, the insignificant coefficient on Guider in Column (4) is not 
consistent with either the “short-term focus” explanation or the “information asymmetry” explanation. If 
quarterly guiders are more focused on short-term financial results than non-guiders, then I would expect to 
find that quarterly guiders are less likely than non-guiders to just miss the final analyst consensus forecast, 
leading to a negative coefficient on Guider. This would occur to the extent that quarterly guiders use their 
forecasts to shift from the “just miss” category to the “just meet” category. Conversely, if quarterly 
earnings guidance is issued to reduce information asymmetry, then I would expect to find that quarterly 
guiders are more likely than non-guiders to just miss the final analyst consensus forecast, leading to a 
positive coefficient on Guider. This would occur to the extent that quarterly earnings guidance reduces the 
absolute value of analysts’ forecast errors, thereby leading to more instances when the firm’s actual 
earnings “just miss” the final analyst consensus forecast. The insignificant coefficient on Guider in Column 
(4) suggests that both effects may be present, and that they cancel each other out on average. In other 
words, there may be some instances when firms issue quarterly earnings guidance to reduce information 
asymmetry, and others when firms issue quarterly earnings guidance to avoid missing short-term earnings 
expectations. 
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consensus forecast for the quarter, and the results in Columns (2), (3), and (4) help to rule 
out alternative explanations that this finding is driven by strong performance or 
reductions in information asymmetry. 
Table 5 provides an alternative test of my first hypothesis by comparing the 
language used in the 10-Ks and conference calls of quarterly guiders and non-guiders. 
Column (1) presents results where the dependent variable is 10-K:St÷Lt. I find a 
significantly positive coefficient on Guider (t-statistic = 2.70), indicating that the 
discussion in quarterly guiders’ 10-Ks tends to be more focused on the short term than 
the discussion in non-guiders’ 10-Ks. Economically, the coefficient of 0.030 indicates 
that the ratio of 10-K:St÷Lt is about 8.17 percent higher for quarterly guiders than non-
guiders (0.030 ÷ 0.367 = 0.082). The coefficient on Guider is negative in Column (2), 
where the dependent variable is 10-K:%LtView, although it is not statistically significant 
(t-statistic = -0.16). Thus, I do not find a significant difference in the extent to which 
quarterly guiders and non-guiders discuss long-term strategy in their 10-Ks. Column (3) 
presents results where the dependent variable is ConfCall:St÷Lt, the measure of 
managerial short-termism developed by Brochet et al. (2015). The significantly positive 
coefficient of 0.169 indicates that the ratio of short-term conference call words to long-
term conference call words is about 13.41 percent higher for quarterly guiders than for 
non-guiders (0.169 ÷ 1.260 = 0.134; t-statistic = 1.95). Overall, the results in Table 5 
provide additional support for the claim that quarterly earnings guidance increases a 
manager’s focus on short-term performance, as it appears that quarterly guiders choose to 
discuss more short-term matters in their corporate disclosures.17  
 
17 The results in Table 5 are similar when I replace the dependent variables with their decile rankings, 
which helps to mitigate concerns that skewness impacts my findings. 
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The findings in Tables 4 and 5 may help to explain why prominent business 
leaders such as Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon seem to be convinced that quarterly 
earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia. These individuals may observe that 
quarterly guiders are more likely to meet short-term earnings expectations and provide 
more short-term oriented discussion in their corporate disclosures, and assume that poor 
performance necessarily follows. However, these impressions do not take into account 
whether quarterly earnings guidance is actually “unhealthy” in that it reduces a firm’s 
long-term value. 
To investigate this issue, in Table 6 I present results related to my second 
hypothesis, which relates to differences in long-term performance between quarterly 
guiders and non-guiders. In Column (1), the significantly positive coefficient of 0.054 on 
Guider (t-statistic = 2.00) represents the estimated difference in size- and industry-
adjusted returns between quarterly guiders and non-guiders over quarters t to t+11, which 
averages 0.039 for quarterly guiders and -0.015 for non-guiders. The significantly 
positive coefficient on Guider in Column (3) (t-statistic = 3.15) indicates that quarterly 
guiders also outperform non-guiders over quarters t to t+11 with regard to their 
accounting performance. Specifically, my results suggest that quarterly guiders report 
industry-adjusted asset turnover that is about 11.81 percent higher than non-guiders 
(0.047 ÷ 0.398 = 0.118). When the dependent variable is industry-adjusted return on 
assets (Column 2), an alternative measure of accounting performance, the coefficient on 
guider is positive and marginally insignificant (t-statistic = 1.63). In Column (4), I do not 
find a significant difference between quarterly guiders and non-guiders regarding sales 
growth, although the coefficient on Guider is positive (t-statistic = 0.10). Last, I find that 
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the coefficient on Guider is significantly positive in Column (5), where the dependent 
variable is industry-adjusted operating cash flows scaled by lagged total assets (t-statistic 
= 3.78). The coefficient of 0.022 indicates that the industry-adjusted operating cash flows 
of quarterly guiders are about 17.89 percent higher over quarters t to t+11 than those of 
non-guiders (0.022 ÷ 0.123 = 0.179). 
In sum, the results in Table 6 do not support the claim that quarterly earnings 
guidance leads to a sacrifice of long-term value. It appears that instead, quarterly guiders 
perform better than observably similar non-guiders over the following three years. This 
may be the result of quarterly earnings guidance reducing the firm’s information 
asymmetry, signaling high managerial ability, or lowering the firm’s exposure to 
litigation risk. In addition, quarterly earnings guidance may improve the firm’s long-term 
performance by enabling the manager to meet analysts’ earnings expectations without 
engaging in value-decreasing earnings management. 
 Considered collectively, the results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest that although 
quarterly earnings guidance increases a manager’s focus on short-term financial results, it 
does not detract from the firm’s long-term performance. In other words, my results 
support the view that, among the firms that choose to provide it, the marginal benefits of 
quarterly earnings guidance exceed the marginal costs. Thus, my findings do not support 
critics’ claims that quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia. They are 
instead more consistent with the theory that voluntary disclosures are provided when they 
are expected to be value-increasing (Dye 2001).  
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CHAPTER V 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Cross-Sectional Tests 
To explore my conjecture that quarterly guiders outperform non-guiders in the 
long term because quarterly earnings guidance reduces information asymmetry, signals 
high managerial ability, and lowers litigation risk, I add an interaction term to my earlier 
specification as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where I replace Benefit with proxies for information asymmetry, managerial ability, and 
litigation risk. A positive coefficient on the interaction term would support my 
conjecture, as it would suggest that the benefits of quarterly earnings guidance increase 
with these factors. I use analyst forecast dispersion at the beginning of the quarter (prior 
to the issuance of earnings guidance) to measure information asymmetry. Unlike other 
proxies, such as the bid-ask spread, this measure should capture information asymmetry 
without being influenced by the provision of quarterly earnings guidance. I measure 
managerial ability using management forecast accuracy (Baik et al. 2011). Because the 
sample for this test excludes non-guiders, I omit Guider and Guider×Benefit from 
Equation (2) and focus on Benefit as bearing the coefficient of interest.18 I specify both 
my information asymmetry and managerial ability variables as indicator variables split at 
the median for ease of interpretation. Last, I measure litigation risk using an indicator 
 
18 The sample excludes non-guiders because management forecast accuracy (the dependent variable) is 
only available for firms that issue a forecast. 
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variable that is set equal to one (zero) when a firm belongs (does not belong) to a high 
litigation-risk industry (Francis et al. 1994; Kim and Skinner 2012).  
 The results in Panel A of Table 7 suggest that quarterly earnings guidance is more 
beneficial for firms with higher information asymmetry, as β3 is positive in all 
specifications and statistically significant in two out of five specifications. Similarly, the 
results in Panel B are consistent with the view that firms enjoy greater benefits from 
quarterly earnings guidance when their managers possess higher ability, as the coefficient 
of interest is positive and statistically significant in three out of five specifications.19 In 
Panel C, I do not find significant differences in the extent to which firms benefit from 
quarterly earnings guidance based on litigation risk. Taken together, the results in Table 7 
are consistent with my conjecture that quarterly guiders outperform non-guiders because 
quarterly earnings guidance reduces information asymmetry and signals high managerial 
ability. 
Earnings Management and Underinvestment 
An additional explanation for my finding that quarterly guiders outperform non-
guiders in the long term is that their managers are able to meet analysts’ earnings 
expectations without engaging in value-decreasing earnings management. Therefore, I 
examine whether quarterly guiders are less inclined to use real and accrual-based 
earnings management, and whether quarterly guiders are less likely to underinvest. These 
tests also address the claim that quarterly earnings guidance encourages these behaviors. 
For example, Warren Buffett writes in a letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, 
“… I have observed many instances in which CEOs engaged in uneconomic operating 
 
19 The results in Panel B of Table 7 are similar when I include or exclude managerial ability scores as a 
control variable. In the tabulated results, managerial ability scores are included in my list of controls. 
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maneuvers so that they could meet [the earnings guidance] they had announced. Worse 
still, after exhausting all that operating acrobatics would do, they sometimes played a 
wide variety of accounting games to ‘make the numbers’,” (Buffett 2000). 
To test the claim that quarterly earnings guidance leads to more earnings 
management, I calculate discretionary R&D expenses and discretionary SG&A expenses 
as the residuals from models that predict a firm’s expected R&D and SG&A expenses by 
2-digit SIC industry and year-quarter (Vorst 2016). Following Call et al. (2014), I 
calculate discretionary accruals as the absolute value of the residuals from the Jones 
(1991) model after controlling for economic losses, again estimated by 2-digit SIC 
industry and year-quarter. I also form a total earnings management measure by summing 
the decile rankings of a firm’s discretionary R&D expenses, discretionary SG&A 
expenses, and discretionary accruals (where discretionary R&D and SG&A expenses are 
multiplied by negative one prior to ranking so that each component is increasing with 
earnings management). I then re-estimate Equation (1) using each of these measures of 
earnings management as the dependent variable. 
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 8. I find a significantly positive 
coefficient on Guider in Column (1), suggesting that quarterly guiders report more 
discretionary R&D expenses than non-guiders (t-statistic = 3.38). The coefficient on 
Guider is positive but insignificant in Column (2), where the dependent variable is 
discretionary SG&A expenses (t-statistic = 1.38). These results are consistent with 
quarterly guiders engaging in less real earnings management than non-guiders. In 
Column (3), the coefficient on Guider is negative but insignificant with respect to the 
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magnitude of discretionary accruals (t-statistic = -0.69).20 Last, the coefficient on Guider 
is significantly negative in Column (4), which is consistent with quarterly guiders using 
less total earnings management than non-guiders (t-statistic = -3.37). Thus, in contrast to 
the claims of prominent business leaders, I find no evidence that quarterly earnings 
guidance increases earnings management. These results support my conjecture that, by 
enabling the manager to influence analysts’ earnings expectations, quarterly earnings 
guidance reduces the need to manage earnings. 
Next, to test the claim that quarterly earnings guidance leads to underinvestment 
(e.g., Buffett and Dimon 2018), I examine whether quarterly guiders are more likely to 
underinvest in capital assets, R&D, M&A, and in total. Accordingly, I specify four 
indicator variables that are set equal to one in quarters when a firm’s investments fall into 
the bottom quartile of unexpected investment, and zero otherwise (Biddle, Hilary, and 
Verdi 2009). Following Biddle et al. (2009), I calculate unexpected investment as the 
residual from regressing investments on lagged sales growth by 2-digit SIC industry and 
year-quarter. I re-estimate Equation (1) using each of these underinvestment indicators as 
the dependent variable. 
The results in Panel B of Table 8 suggest that quarterly guiders are less likely to 
underinvest than non-guiders. Specifically, I find a significantly negative coefficient on 
Guider when the dependent variable is the R&D underinvestment indicator (Column 2; t-
statistic = -2.27). I do not find a significant difference between quarterly guiders and non-
 
20 My finding that there is no significant difference in the use of discretionary accruals between quarterly 
guiders and non-guiders contrasts with the results of Call et al. (2014), who report that quarterly guiders 
record fewer discretionary accruals than non-guiders. However, I do find significant evidence that quarterly 
guiders record fewer discretionary accruals in a robustness test, where I use a propensity score matching 
methodology rather than entropy balancing (Table 10). Differences in research design may therefore 
explain why the results in Table 8 contrast with those of Call et al. (2014), who rely primarily on a 
propensity-matched sample to test their hypotheses. 
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guiders with regard to their capital asset underinvestment (Column 1), M&A 
underinvestment (Column 3), or total underinvestment (Column 4), although the relevant 
coefficients are all negative (t-statistics = -1.36, -1.40, and -1.10, respectively). These 
findings do not support critics’ claims that quarterly earnings guidance encourages 
underinvestment. Instead, they support the view that quarterly earnings guidance enables 
a manager to invest more freely because, as a result of her ability to influence the analyst 
consensus forecast, the manager is less concerned that her investments will cause the firm 
to miss short-term earnings expectations. 
Other Short-Term Pressures 
I next examine whether quarterly earnings guidance tends to lower long-term 
performance when it coincides with other short-term pressures. These tests are in 
response to the SEC’s interest in learning whether quarterly earnings guidance is more 
likely to lead to managerial myopia when it is combined with other factors.21 To provide 
evidence on this issue, I estimate Equation (2) and replace Benefits with measures of 
short-term pressure. Brochet et al. (2015) identify transient institutional ownership, 
analyst following, and stock-based compensation as factors that should increase 
managerial short-termism. I therefore specify indicator variables split at the median for 
high transient institutional ownership, high analyst following, and high stock-based 
compensation, and include these indicators in my regressions. Negative coefficients on 
the interaction terms between these factors and Guider would suggest that the benefits of 
quarterly earnings guidance are diminished when the practice is combined with other 
short-term pressures.  
 
21 The SEC’s call for comments on quarterly earnings guidance can be viewed at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-287. 
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In Table 9, I find very little evidence to support the view that any of these factors 
has an impact on the relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and long-term 
performance. Across Panels A, B, and C, only two of the fifteen the coefficients of 
interest are statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, it does not appear that 
quarterly earnings guidance is more likely to be detrimental to long-term performance 
when it is combined with other short-term pressures. 
Robustness Tests 
Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
I rely on entropy balancing in my primary analyses to improve the similarity of 
the covariate distributions between quarterly guiders and non-guiders. This approach 
allows me to reweight the observations in my sample so that non-guiders are comparable 
to quarterly guiders. I can also seek to achieve this objective by using propensity score 
matching, where each quarterly guider observation is matched to a non-guider 
observation with a similar propensity score. As a robustness test, I repeat the tests shown 
in Tables 4-6 and 8 using propensity score matching to assess whether my findings are 
sensitive to the use of entropy balancing. 
Specifically, I estimate a propensity score for each observation in my sample by 
regressing an indicator variable set equal to one for quarterly guiders and zero for non-
guiders on the firm characteristics listed in Panel A of Table 2. I then match each 
quarterly guider observation with the non-guider observation that has the closest 
propensity score, requiring that matches occur within the same 2-digit SIC industry and 
year-quarter. This process results in a sample of 4,081 quarterly guider observations and 
4,081 non-guider observations. Although I drop matches when there are sizeable 
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differences in their propensity scores, I find that there are still small (but statistically 
significant) differences between the quarterly guiders and non-guiders in my matched 
sample. For example, I note that quarterly guiders, on average, have significantly larger 
market values of equity, more analyst coverage, and higher institutional ownership than 
matched non-guiders. 
I use this matched sample of quarterly guiders and non-guiders to repeat my tests, 
and I report the results in Table 10. The results are strikingly similar to those from my 
primary analyses using entropy balancing. In Panel A, I continue to find evidence that 
quarterly guiders are more focused on meeting short-term earnings expectations than 
non-guiders. Panel B suggests that quarterly guiders also use more short-term language in 
their 10-Ks than non-guiders.22 Thus, my propensity score matching analyses likewise 
support the conclusion that quarterly earnings guidance shifts a manager’s attention to the 
short term. Panel C shows that quarterly guiders outperform matched non-guiders with 
regard to their size- and industry-adjusted returns, industry-adjusted asset turnover, and 
industry-adjusted operating cash flows over quarters t to t+11. Again, this is consistent 
with my main results. Last, Panels D and E provide additional evidence that quarterly 
guiders are less inclined than non-guiders to engage in earnings management or to 
underinvest. 
Thus, it does not appear that my results are sensitive to the use of entropy 
balancing, as I draw the same inferences when I instead use propensity score matching. I 
note that the absolute magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients of interest 
 
22 I do not report results related to conference call language as part of my propensity-score matching 
analysis because there are very few observations available to run this test from my hand-collected sample 
of conference call transcripts. Specifically, there is conference call data available for fewer than 30 of my 
matched firm-quarter observations. 
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tend to be larger in Table 10 than in my primary analyses. This is not surprising, as 
descriptive statistics reveal that entropy balancing is more effective than propensity score 
matching in eliminating observable differences quarterly guiders and non-guiders. The 
unresolved differences under propensity score matching likely contribute to the larger 
differences between quarterly guiders and non-guiders observed in Table 10. Entropy 
balancing also allows me to test my hypotheses using a larger sample of quarterly 
guiders, enhancing the generalizability of my results. As a consequence, I place greater 
confidence in my primary analyses. However, the results in Table 10 provide some 
assurance that my results are robust to alternative specifications.  
Difference-In-Difference Analysis 
In my primary analyses, I conduct cross-sectional tests where I compare quarterly 
guiders to an entropy-balanced sample of non-guiders. Thus, my counterfactual is a group 
of firms that do not provide quarterly earnings guidance, yet possess observably similar 
features to the firms that do choose to provide it. An alternative is to compare quarterly 
guiders in the quarters before and after they commence quarterly earnings guidance.23 
This alternative approach is useful in that it controls for factors that are stable within a 
firm over time. However, it is limited to a sample of initiators, and it is subject to biases 
related to the decision to start providing quarterly earnings guidance, i.e., the firm’s 
underlying economic conditions may not be stable across the pre- and post- periods. I 
estimate my difference-in-difference analysis around the initiation of quarterly earnings 
 
23 Testing for evidence of managerial myopia around the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance may be 
more problematic because there is evidence that poor performance drives the decision to stop providing 
quarterly earnings guidance (Houston et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2011). Consequently, it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of discontinuing quarterly earnings guidance from the effects of poor performance.  
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guidance, using a matched sample of non-guiders to account for time trends over the 
initiation period. 
I identify 449 firms that initiate regular quarterly earnings guidance over my 
sample period of 2003 to 2015, and I use coarsened exact matching to match them with 
non-guiders in the quarter prior to earnings guidance initiation (Iacus, King, and Porro 
2012). I require that matches occur in the same year-quarter and 2-digit SIC industry. 
Additionally, matches must fall within the same quartile of analyst following, calculated 
by fiscal year and 1-digit SIC industry. Among firms that satisfy these requirements, I 
select the control firm with the closest market value of equity to the treatment firm.24 I 
then estimate my difference-in-difference analysis over the pre- and post-treatment 
periods consisting of quarters t-8 to t-1 and quarters t to t+7, respectively, where earnings 
guidance is initiated in quarter t. To execute this analysis, I estimate the following 
regression: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where I replace Outcome with various dependent variables as needed to test my 
hypotheses. Starter distinguishes the firms that initiate quarterly earnings guidance from 
their matched control firms, whereas Post distinguishes the pre-period from the post-
period. Thus, the coefficient of interest is on the interaction Starter×Post. As in my 
previous tests, I include each of the firm characteristics listed in Panel A of Table 2 as 
 
24 In my difference-in-difference analysis, I use coarsened exact matching rather than propensity score 
matching because it appears to be more effective, at least in this setting, at improving the similarity of the 
covariate distributions between treatment and control firms, while also enabling me to preserve a greater 
number of guidance initiators in my sample. 
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control variables. I also include industry (2-digit SIC) and year-quarter fixed effects, and 
cluster the standard errors by firm and year-quarter. 
The results are shown in Table 11. Overall, my inferences remain unchanged. In 
Panel A, I continue to find evidence that quarterly earnings guidance increases a 
manager’s focus on short-term financial results, as the coefficient on Starter×Post is 
significantly positive when the dependent variable is MeetFinal (t-statistic = 4.17). In 
Panel B, I also find that the extent to which quarterly guiders discuss long-term strategy 
in their 10-Ks declines more from the pre-period to the post-period than for non-guiders 
(t-statistic = -2.77). The coefficient on Starter×Post is positive and only marginally 
insignificant, however, when the dependent variable is the ratio of short-term 10-K words 
to long-term 10-K words (t-statistic = 1.57).25 
The results in Panel C reveal no indication that initiation of quarterly earnings 
guidance lowers a firm’s long-term performance, as the coefficients on Starter×Post are 
generally positive but statistically insignificant. There is weak evidence that industry-
adjusted operating cash flows increase more for quarterly guiders than for non-guiders 
over the pre- to post-periods (t-statistic = 1.25). The coefficients on Starter×Post also 
tend to be statistically insignificant in Panels D and E, where changes in earnings 
management and underinvestment are examined. There is weak evidence that total 
earnings management and underinvestment in capital assets declines more for quarterly 
guiders than non-guiders (t-statistics = -1.19 and -1.31, respectively).  
 
25 I do not report results related to conference call language as part of my difference-in-difference analysis 
because there are very few observations available to run this test from my hand-collected sample of 
conference call transcripts. Specifically, there is conference call data available for fewer than ten firms that 
initiate quarterly earnings guidance. 
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My difference-in-difference specifications are likely to suffer from a lack of 
power due to my small sample of initiators, so it is important to note that the signs of the 
coefficients on Starter×Post in Table 11 are generally consistent with those reported for 
the coefficients of interest in Tables 4-6 and 8. At a minimum, the results reported in 
Table 11 fail to support the contention that quarterly earnings guidance leads to a loss of 
long-term value. They also reinforce my finding that quarterly earnings guidance 
increases a manager’s attention to short-term performance. This provides greater 
confidence that my main results are not driven by firm-specific correlated omitted 
variables. 
Other Robustness Tests 
I perform several other tests to examine the robustness of my finding that 
quarterly guiders outperform non-guiders in the long term, and I report the results in 
Table 12. Overall, my inferences remain unchanged when I make any of the following 
adjustments to my research design: 
• I estimate long-term performance over five years rather than three years 
• I include the following variables both in my entropy balancing procedure and 
as additional control variables: 
- Analysts’ forecasts for the firm’s long-term growth 
- Firm-specific competition (Li, Lundholm, and Minnis 2013) 
- The firm’s propensity to meet the final analyst consensus forecast 
(MeetFinal) 
These robustness tests provide additional assurance that my results are not the 
product of functional form misspecification or correlated omitted variables.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
I examine the claim that quarterly earnings guidance leads a manager to sacrifice 
long-term value to meet short-term earnings expectations (i.e., become myopic). Using an 
entropy balanced sample of quarterly guiders and non-guiders, I find evidence that 
quarterly earnings guidance increases a manager’s focus on short-term earnings, as 
quarterly guiders are more likely than non-guiders to meet analysts’ quarterly earnings 
expectations. Quarterly guiders also tend to use a greater proportion of short-term 
language in their 10-Ks and conference calls, which is consistent with a greater fixation 
on short-term financial results. However, I do not find evidence that quarterly earnings 
guidance detracts from a firm’s long-term performance. My results suggest that quarterly 
guiders outperform non-guiders over the next three and five years across a variety of 
measures, including size- and industry-adjusted returns, industry-adjusted asset turnover, 
and industry-adjusted operating cash flows. Thus, my findings do not support the view 
that quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia. 
 My research is timely given the SEC’s ongoing investigation into the desirability 
of quarterly reporting and quarterly earnings guidance. Although prominent business 
leaders call for suspension of the practice, my results suggest that among the firms that 
choose to provide it, the marginal benefits of providing quarterly earnings guidance 
exceed the marginal costs. In addition to having direct policy implications, my study 
contributes to the broader literatures on earnings guidance and the real effects of 
disclosure. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Quarterly earnings guidance 
  
Guidert An indicator variable set equal to one when firm i provides 
earnings guidance for every quarter over a minimum of twelve 
consecutive quarters; and zero when firm i does not provide 
earnings guidance for any quarter over a minimum of twelve 
consecutive quarters. 
  
Firm characteristics 
  
ln(Market value 
of equity)t 
The natural logarithm of firm i's market value of equity 
(CSHOQ×PRCCQ) in quarter t (in millions). 
 
Managerial 
abilityt 
The managerial ability score calculated by Demerjian, Lev, and 
McVay (2012) for firm i in the fiscal year that contains quarter t. 
Managerial ability scores are generously provided by Peter 
Demerjian at his website, 
https://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. 
 
Book-to-market 
ratiot 
Firm i's total equity (SEQ) in quarter t divided by firm i's market 
value of equity (CSHOQ×PRCCQ) in quarter t. 
 
Leveraget Total liabilities (LTQ) for firm i in quarter t, divided by total assets 
(ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
 
Bid-ask spreadt The average daily bid-ask spread for firm i in quarter t, multiplied 
by 100. The daily bid-ask spread is calculated as the absolute 
difference between firm i’s closing bid and ask prices, scaled by 
firm i’s closing stock price. 
 
Analyst forecast 
dispersiont 
The standard deviation of analyst forecasts (STDEV) for firm i at 
the beginning of quarter t (prior to the issuance of earnings 
guidance for quarter t), scaled by firm i’s stock price (PRCCQ) at 
the beginning of quarter t, and multiplied by 100. 
 
Return volatilityt The standard deviation of firm i’s daily returns (RET) in quarter t. 
 
Litigation 
industryt 
An indicator variable set equal to one when firm i's 4-digit SIC 
code falls within the following ranges: 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 
3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and zero otherwise 
(Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994). 
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Firm characteristics (continued) 
  
ln(Number of 
analysts)t 
The natural logarithm of the number of analysts (NUMEST) 
following firm i in quarter t. 
 
Transient 
institutional 
ownershipt 
The fraction of firm i’s shares outstanding (SHROUT) in quarter t 
that are reported in 13-F filings as being owned by transient 
institutional investors. The data needed to classify institutional 
investors as transient, quasi-indexer, or dedicated are generously 
provided by Brian Bushee at his website, 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
  
Quasi-indexer 
institutional 
ownershipt 
The fraction of firm i’s shares outstanding (SHROUT) in quarter t 
that are reported in 13-F filings as being owned by quasi-indexer 
institutional investors. The data needed to classify institutional 
investors as transient, quasi-indexer, or dedicated are generously 
provided by Brian Bushee at his website, 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
 
Dedicated 
institutional 
ownershipt 
The fraction of firm i’s shares outstanding (SHROUT) in quarter t 
that are reported in 13-F filings as being owned by dedicated 
institutional investors. The data needed to classify institutional 
investors as transient, quasi-indexer, or dedicated are generously 
provided by Brian Bushee at his website, 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
 
Life cycle: 
Introductiont 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i’s 
operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are negative; investing cash 
flows (IVNCFQ) are negative; and financing cash flows (FINCFQ) 
are positive (Dickinson 2011). 
 
Life cycle: 
Growtht 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i’s 
operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are positive; investing cash flows 
(IVNCFQ) are negative; and financing cash flows (FINCFQ) are 
positive (Dickinson 2011). 
 
Life cycle: 
Maturet 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i’s 
operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are positive; investing cash flows 
(IVNCFQ) are negative; and financing cash flows (FINCFQ) are 
negative (Dickinson 2011). 
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Firm characteristics (continued) 
  
Life cycle: 
Shake-outt 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when: 
• Firm i’s operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are negative; 
investing cash flows (IVNCFQ) are negative; and financing 
cash flows (FINCFQ) are negative. 
• Firm i’s operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are positive; 
investing cash flows (IVNCFQ) are positive; and financing 
cash flows (FINCFQ) are positive. 
• Firm i’s operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are positive; 
investing cash flows (IVNCFQ) are positive; and financing 
cash flows (FINCFQ) are negative (Dickinson 2011). 
 
Life cycle: 
Declinet 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when: 
• Firm i’s operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are negative; 
investing cash flows (IVNCFQ) are positive; and financing 
cash flows (FINCFQ) are positive. 
• Firm i’s operating cash flows (OANCFQ) are negative; 
investing cash flows (IVNCFQ) are positive; and financing 
cash flows (FINCFQ) are negative (Dickinson 2011). 
 
Size- and 
industry-adjusted 
returnst 
Firm i’s size- and industry-adjusted returns for quarter t. To adjust 
for size and industry, I calculate returns over fifty portfolios (five 
size quintiles based on firm i’s market value of equity at the end of 
quarter t-1 × ten 1-digit SIC industries). 
 
Industry-adjusted 
return on assetst 
Firm i’s return on assets in quarter t ((PIQt+XINTQt+DQPt)/ATQt-
1) minus the median return on assets for firm i’s 2-digit SIC 
industry in quarter t. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
asset turnovert 
Firm i’s asset turnover in quarter t (SALEQt/ATQt-1) minus the 
median asset turnover for firm i’s 2-digit SIC industry in quarter t. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
sales growtht 
Firm i’s sales growth in quarter t ((SALEQt/SALEQt-1)-1) minus 
the median sales growth for firm i’s 2-digit SIC industry in quarter 
t. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
operating cash 
flowst 
Firm i’s operating cash flows in quarter t (OANCFQt/ATQt-1) 
minus the median operating cash flows for firm i’s 2-digit SIC 
industry in quarter t. 
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Firm characteristics (continued) 
  
Management 
forecast accuracyt 
The absolute value of firm i's actual earnings for quarter t 
(ACTUAL) minus the manager’s first EPS forecast for quarter t 
(VAL_1), scaled by firm i’s stock price at the beginning of quarter 
t, and multiplied by -100 so that higher values represent greater 
accuracy. For range forecasts, I use the upper bound (VAL_2) to 
proxy for the manager’s forecast (Ciconte, Kirk, and Tucker 2014). 
 
Stock-based 
compensationt 
The residual from regressing the top five executives’ average 
stock- and option-based compensation on market value of equity, 
book-to-market ratio, and industry and year fixed effects, divided 
by 100 (Brochet, Loumioti, and Serafeim 2015). 
 
Competitiont The number of competition-related words in firm i’s 10-K per 
1,000 total words in firm i’s 10-K in the fiscal year that contains 
quarter t. Competition-related words are “competition”, 
“competitor”, “competitive”, “compete”, and “competing”, 
including words that end with an “s” (Li, Lundholm, and Minnis 
2013). 
 
Analysts’ long-
term growth 
forecastt 
Analysts’ long-term growth forecast outstanding for firm i at the 
end of quarter t. 
 
 
Short-term earnings expectations 
  
Meet final analyst 
forecastt 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i's 
actual earnings (ACTUAL) are greater than or equal to the analyst 
consensus forecast (MEANEST) at the earnings announcement 
date for quarter t, and zero otherwise. 
 
Meet initial 
analyst forecastt 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i's 
actual earnings (ACTUAL) are greater than or equal to the analyst 
consensus forecast (MEANEST) at the beginning of quarter t 
(prior to the issuance of earnings guidance for quarter t), and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Just meet final 
analyst forecastt 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i's 
actual earnings (ACTUAL) are greater than or equal to the analyst 
consensus forecast (MEANEST) and less than or equal to the 
analyst consensus forecast plus one cent at the earnings 
announcement date for quarter t, and zero otherwise. 
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Short-term earnings expectations (continued) 
  
Just miss final 
analyst forecastt 
An indicator variable set equal to one in quarter t when firm i's 
actual earnings (ACTUAL) are less than the analyst consensus 
forecast (MEANEST) and greater than or equal to the analyst 
consensus forecast minus one cent at the earnings announcement 
date for quarter t, and zero otherwise. 
 
10-K and conference call language 
  
10-K: Short-term 
words ÷ Long-
term wordst 
The number of short-term words in firm i’s 10-K divided by the 
sum of short-term words and long-term words in firm i’s 10-K in 
the fiscal year that contains quarter t. Short-term words are: “short 
term”, “short-term”, “short run”, and “short-run”. Long-term 
words are: “long term”, “long-term”, “long run”, and “long-run”. I 
exclude short-term words and long-term words when they are 
followed by the words “asset”, “assets”, “liability”, or “liabilities”. 
I obtain 10-Ks from the SEC’s website at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ using Python. I also use Python to 
count the number of short- and long-term words in a firm’s 10-K. 
 
10-K: % Long-
term view wordst 
The number of long-term view words in firm i’s 10-K divided by 
the total number of words in firm i’s 10-K in the fiscal year that 
contains quarter t. Long-term view words are: “firm value”, “value 
creation”, “create value”, “creates value”, “sustain”, “sustainable”, 
“sustainability”, “environment”, “environmental”, “socially 
responsible”, “social responsibility”, and “governance”. This list of 
long-term view words is inspired by letters written by Warren 
Buffett, Jamie Dimon, and Larry Fink, which can be accessed via 
the following links:  
• https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/2016-larry-fink-ceo-letter  
• https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-is-harming-
the-economy-1528336801 
I obtain 10-Ks from the SEC’s website at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ using Python. I also use Python to 
count the number of long-term view words in a firm’s 10-K. 
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10-K and conference call language (continued) 
  
Conference call: 
Short-term words 
÷ Long-term 
wordst 
The number of short-term words in firm i’s conference call divided 
by the number of long-term words in firm i’s conference call for 
quarter t. Following Brochet, Loumioti, and Serafeim (2015), 
short-term words are: “day(s)”, “daily”, “short term”, “short-term”, 
“short run”, “short-run”, “week(s)”, “weekly”, “month(s)”, 
“monthly”, “quarter(s)”, and “quarterly”. Long-term words are: 
“long term”, “long-term”, “long run”, “long-run”, “year(s)”, 
“annual(ly)”, “look(ing) ahead”, and “outlook”. I hand collect 
conference call transcripts from Capital IQ, and I use Python to 
count the number of short- and long-term words in a firm’s 
conference call. 
 
Long-term performance 
  
Size- and 
industry-adjusted 
returnst,t+11 
Firm i’s size- and industry-adjusted returns over quarters t to t+11. 
To adjust for size and industry, I calculate returns over fifty 
portfolios (five size quintiles based on firm i’s market value of 
equity at the end of quarter t-1 × ten 1-digit SIC industries). 
 
Industry-adjusted 
return on 
assetst,t+11 
Firm i’s return on assets in quarter t ((PIQt+XINTQt+DQPt)/ATQt-
1) minus the median return on assets for firm i’s 2-digit SIC 
industry in quarter t, summed over quarters t to t+11. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
asset turnovert,t+11 
Firm i’s asset turnover in quarter t (SALEQt/ATQt-1) minus the 
median asset turnover for firm i’s 2-digit SIC industry in quarter t, 
summed over quarters t to t+11. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
sales growtht,t+11 
Firm i’s sales growth in quarter t ((SALEQt/SALEQt-1)-1) minus 
the median sales growth for firm i’s 2-digit SIC industry in quarter 
t, summed over quarters t to t+11. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
operating cash 
flowst,t+11 
Firm i’s operating cash flows in quarter t (OANCFQt/ATQt-1) 
minus the median operating cash flows for firm i’s 2-digit SIC 
industry in quarter t, summed over quarters t to t+11. 
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Earnings management 
  
Discretionary 
R&D expensest 
The residual from estimating the following regression by quarter 
and 2-digit SIC industry, multiplied by 100 (Vorst 2016): 
XRDQt/ATQt-1 = β0 + β11/ATQt-1 + β2lnMVEt + β3TobinsQt + 
β4InternalFundst/ATQt-1 + β5SALEQt/ATQt-1 + β6ΔSALEQt + εt 
where TobinsQ is calculated as: (PRCCQt×CSHOQt + PSTKQt + 
DLTTQt + DLCQt)/ATQt-1, and InternalFunds is calculated as: 
IBQt + DPQt + XRDQt. I require a minimum of 20 observations 
per industry-quarter to estimate the model. 
 
Discretionary 
SG&A expensest 
The residual from estimating the following regression by quarter 
and 2-digit SIC industry, multiplied by 100 (Vorst 2016): 
XSGAQt/ATQt-1 = β0 + β11/ATQt-1 + β2lnMVEt + β3TobinsQt + 
β4InternalFundst/ATQt-1 + β5ΔSALEQt/ATQt-1 + β6ΔSALEQt/ATQt-
1 × NegΔSALEQt + εt 
where TobinsQ is calculated as: (PRCCQt×CSHOQt + PSTKQt + 
DLTTQt + DLCQt)/ATQt-1, and InternalFunds is calculated as: 
IBQt + DPQt + XRDQt. I require a minimum of 20 observations 
per industry-quarter to estimate the model. 
 
Discretionary 
accrualst 
The absolute value of the residual from estimating the following 
regression by quarter and 2-digit SIC industry, multiplied by 100 
(Call, Chen, and Miao 2014): 
Accrualst/ATQt-1 = β0 + β1ΔSALEQt/ATQt-1 + β2PPENTQt-1/ATQt-1 
+ β3Indadj_CFOt/ATQt-1 + β4NegIndadj_CFO + 
β5Indadj_CFOt/ATQt-1 × NegIndadj_CFOt + εt 
where Accruals is calculated as: IBCQt – OANCFQt, and 
Indadj_CFO is calculated as: OANCFQt minus the median 
OANCFQt for firm i’s 2-digit SIC industry in quarter t. I require a 
minimum of 20 observations per industry-quarter to estimate the 
model. 
 
Total earnings 
managementt 
The summed decile rankings of firm i’s discretionary R&D 
expenses, discretionary SG&A expenses, and discretionary 
accruals in quarter t, where discretionary R&D and SG&A 
expenses are multiplied by negative one so that they are increasing 
in earnings management. 
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Underinvestment 
  
Underinvestment 
in capital assetst 
An indicator variable set equal to one when firm i’s investments in 
capital assets (CAPXQ-SPPEQ) fall into the bottom quartile of 
unexpected investments in capital assets in quarter t. Unexpected 
investments in capital assets is the residual from estimating the 
following model by quarter and 2-digit SIC industry, multiplied by 
100 (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009): 
(CAPXQt-SPPEQt)/ATQt-1 = β0 + β1SalesGrowtht-1 + εt 
where SalesGrowth is calculated as: (SALEQt/SALEQt-1)-1. I 
require a minimum of 20 observations per industry-quarter to 
estimate the model. 
 
Underinvestment 
in R&Dt 
An indicator variable set equal to one when firm i’s investments in 
research and development (XRDQ) fall into the bottom quartile of 
unexpected R&D investments in quarter t. Unexpected R&D 
investments is the residual from estimating the following model by 
quarter and 2-digit SIC industry, multiplied by 100 (Biddle, Hilary, 
and Verdi 2009): 
XRDQt/ATQt-1 = β0 + β1SalesGrowtht-1 + εt 
where SalesGrowth is calculated as: (SALEQt/SALEQt-1)-1. I 
require a minimum of 20 observations per industry-quarter to 
estimate the model. 
 
Underinvestment 
in M&At 
An indicator variable set equal to one when firm i’s mergers and 
acquisitions (AQCQ) fall into the bottom quartile of unexpected 
M&A in quarter t. Unexpected M&A is the residual from 
estimating the following model by quarter and 2-digit SIC 
industry, multiplied by 100 (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009): 
AQCQt/ATQt-1 = β0 + β1SalesGrowtht-1 + εt 
where SalesGrowth is calculated as: (SALEQt/SALEQt-1)-1. I 
require a minimum of 20 observations per industry-quarter to 
estimate the model. 
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Underinvestment (continued) 
  
Total 
underinvestmentt 
An indicator variable set equal to one when firm i’s Investments 
fall into the bottom quartile of unexpected investment in quarter t. 
Investments is the sum of R&D expenses (XRDQ), capital 
expenditures (CAPXQ), and acquisitions (AQCQ) minus sales of 
PP&E (SPPEQ) for firm i in quarter t, scaled by total assets (ATQ) 
in quarter t-1 (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). Unexpected 
investment is the residual from estimating the following model by 
quarter and 2-digit SIC industry, multiplied by 100 (Biddle, Hilary, 
and Verdi 2009): 
Investmentst = β0 + β1SalesGrowtht-1 + εt 
where SalesGrowth is calculated as: (SALEQt/SALEQt-1)-1. I 
require a minimum of 20 observations per industry-quarter to 
estimate the model. 
 
Difference-in-difference analysis 
  
Starter An indicator variable set equal to one for firms that initiate the 
provision of quarterly earnings guidance (for a minimum of twelve 
consecutive quarters); and zero for matched control firms that do 
not initiate quarterly earnings guidance. 
 
Post An indicator variable set equal to one in the post-earnings 
guidance initiation quarters of t to t+7, and zero in the pre-earnings 
guidance initiation quarters of t-8 to t-1, where earnings guidance 
is initiated in quarter t. 
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APPENDIX B 
SPORADIC QUARTERLY EARNINGS GUIDANCE 
  
Guider  
Sporadic 
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
  mean  mean  t-stat  mean  mean  t-stat 
  median  median    median  median   
             
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  7.504   7.120  19.40***  7.504   6.824   36.94*** 
 7.384   6.966     7.384   6.617     
Managerial abilityt  0.027   0.002  14.61***  0.027   0.007   13.29*** 
 -0.013   -0.031     -0.013   -0.031     
Book-to-market ratiot-1  0.446   0.498  -13.75***  0.446   0.514   -17.08*** 
 0.379   0.429     0.379   0.425     
Leveraget-1  0.423   0.460  -14.88***  0.423   0.478   -22.86*** 
 0.410   0.466     0.410   0.470     
Bid-ask spreadt-1  0.166   0.280  -27.83***  0.166   0.352   -37.72*** 
 0.100   0.141     0.100   0.158     
Analyst forecast dispersiont  0.238   0.311  -9.50***  0.238   0.825   -19.12*** 
 0.077   0.084     0.077   0.115     
Return volatilityt-1  0.025   0.027  -11.60***  0.025   0.029   -24.28*** 
 0.022   0.023     0.022   0.025     
Litigation industryt  0.546   0.409  22.30***  0.546   0.352   39.12*** 
 1.000   0.000     1.000   0.000     
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  2.081   1.772  31.12***  2.081   1.440   68.78*** 
 2.197   1.792     2.197   1.386     
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  0.154   0.141  9.73***  0.154   0.114   36.00*** 
 0.145   0.123     0.145   0.095     
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  0.475   0.419  16.96***  0.475   0.348   46.90*** 
 0.533   0.473     0.533   0.372     
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  0.029   0.034  -6.74***  0.029   0.027   4.80*** 
 0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000     
Life cycle: Introductiont-1  0.070   0.107  -10.20***  0.070   0.124   -16.34*** 
 0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000     
Life cycle: Growtht-1  0.282   0.267  2.71***  0.282   0.243   8.72*** 
 0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000     
Life cycle: Maturet-1  0.460   0.433  4.38***  0.460   0.419   8.05*** 
 0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000     
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.156   0.141  3.48***  0.156   0.142   3.76*** 
 0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000     
Life cycle: Declinet-1  0.031   0.052  -8.37***  0.031   0.071   -15.99*** 
 0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000     
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  0.008   0.002  2.80***  0.008   0.004   1.82* 
 0.002   -0.009     0.002   -0.008     
Industry-adjusted return on assetst 
 
 0.011   0.007  8.38***  0.011   0.002   18.30*** 
 0.009   0.006     0.009   0.005     
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  0.037   0.034  1.64  0.037   0.039   -1.19 
 0.005   0.005     0.005   0.009     
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  0.015   0.014  0.05  0.015   0.027   -5.19*** 
 0.004   0.000     0.004   0.000     
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  0.012   0.008  10.57***  0.012   0.003   19.94*** 
 0.011   0.006     0.011   0.004     
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 Guider  
Sporadic 
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  11,494   14,792    11,494   51,362    
             
             
Appendix B reports descriptive statistics for quarterly guiders, sporadic quarterly guiders, and non-guiders. 
Quarterly guiders are defined as firms that provide earnings guidance for every quarter over a minimum of 
twelve consecutive quarters. Sporadic quarterly guiders are defined as firms that provide earnings guidance 
for one to eleven quarters over twelve consecutive quarters. Last, non-guiders are defined as firms that do 
not provide earnings guidance for any quarter over a minimum of twelve consecutive quarters. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
  Firm-quarter 
observations 
   
CRSP-Compustat merged database, 2001-2018  428,609  
Lagged and leading observations outside sample period of 2003-2015  (121,908) 
  306,701 
Utility and financial services industries  (117,462) 
  189,239 
Observations missing necessary CRSP-Compustat variables  (76,174) 
  113,065 
Observations missing necessary I/B/E/S variables  (29,140) 
  83,925  
Observations missing managerial ability scores  (2,095) 
  81,830 
Observations not classified as a quarterly guider or non-guider  (18,974) 
  62,856 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
     
  Without entropy balancing  With entropy balancing 
             
  
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
  mean  mean  t-stat  mean  mean  t-stat 
  median  median    median  median   
             
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  7.504   6.824   36.94***  7.504   7.504  0.00 
 7.384   6.617      7.384   7.413   
Managerial abilityt  0.027   0.007   13.29***  0.027   0.027  0.00 
 -0.013   -0.031      -0.013   -0.010   
Book-to-market ratiot-1  0.446   0.514   -17.08***  0.446   0.446  -0.01 
 0.379   0.425      0.379   0.382   
Leveraget-1  0.423   0.478   -22.86***  0.423   0.423  0.00 
 0.410   0.470      0.410   0.414   
Bid-ask spreadt-1  0.166   0.352   -37.72***  0.166   0.166  0.00 
 0.100   0.158      0.100   0.098   
Analyst forecast dispersiont  0.238   0.825   -19.12***  0.238   0.238  -0.01 
 0.077   0.115      0.077   0.091   
Return volatilityt-1  0.025   0.029   -24.28***  0.025   0.025  0.00 
 0.022   0.025      0.022   0.022   
Litigation industryt  0.546   0.352   39.12***  0.546   0.546  0.01 
 1.000   0.000      1.000   1.000   
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  2.081   1.440   68.78***  2.081   2.081  0.00 
 2.197   1.386      2.197   2.197   
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  0.154   0.114   36.00***  0.154   0.154  0.01 
 0.145   0.095      0.145   0.144   
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  0.475   0.348   46.90***  0.475   0.475  0.01 
 0.533   0.372      0.533   0.537   
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  0.029   0.027   4.80***  0.029   0.029  0.00 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Life cycle: Introductiont-1  0.070   0.124   -16.34***  0.070   0.070  0.01 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Life cycle: Growtht-1  0.282   0.243   8.72***  0.282   0.282  0.00 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Life cycle: Maturet-1  0.460   0.419   8.05***  0.460   0.460  0.00 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.156   0.142   3.76***  0.156   0.156  0.00 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Life cycle: Declinet-1  0.031   0.071   -15.99***  0.031   0.031  0.00 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  0.008   0.004   1.82*  0.008   0.008  0.00 
 0.002   -0.008      0.002   0.000   
Industry-adjusted return on assetst 
 
 0.011   0.002   18.30***  0.011   0.011  0.00 
 0.009   0.005      0.009   0.010   
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  0.037   0.039   -1.19  0.037   0.037  0.00 
 0.005   0.009      0.005   0.008   
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
(continued) 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics (continued) 
     
  Without entropy balancing  With entropy balancing 
             
 
 Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
  mean  mean  t-stat  mean  mean  t-stat 
  median  median    median  median   
             
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  0.015   0.027   -5.19***  0.015   0.015  0.00 
 0.004   0.000      0.004   0.003   
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  0.012   0.003   19.94***  0.012   0.012  0.00 
 0.011   0.004      0.011   0.010   
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  11,494   51,362     11,494   51,362   
             
             
Panel B: Short-term earnings expectations 
     
  Without entropy balancing  With entropy balancing 
             
 
 Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
  mean  mean  t-stat  mean  mean  t-stat 
  median  median    median  median   
             
Meet final analyst forecastt  0.814   0.608   42.22***  0.814   0.695  23.03*** 
 1.000   1.000      1.000   1.000   
Meet initial analyst forecastt  0.604   0.495   21.06***  0.604   0.561  7.01*** 
 1.000   0.000      1.000   1.000   
Just meet final analyst forecastt  0.207   0.126   22.76***  0.207   0.154  10.78*** 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
Just miss final analyst forecastt  0.086   0.069   6.07***  0.086   0.079  1.82* 
 0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000   
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  11,494   51,362    11,494   51,362   
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
(continued) 
 
Panel C: 10-K and conference call language 
             
  Without entropy balancing  With entropy balancing 
             
 
 Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
  mean  mean  t-stat  mean  mean  t-stat 
  median  median    median  median   
             
10-K: Short-term words ÷ Long-term 
wordst 
 0.397   0.344   21.07***  0.397   0.367  10.17*** 
 0.364   0.309      0.364   0.344   
10-K: % Long-term view wordst  0.068   0.077   -11.98***  0.068   0.068  -0.55 
 0.052   0.056      0.052   0.051   
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  9,476  41,849    9,476  41,849   
             
Conference call: Short-term words ÷ 
Long-term wordst 
 1.432  1.416  0.45  1.432  1.257  3.17*** 
 1.210  1.240    1.210  1.170   
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  603  2,674    603  2,674   
             
             
Panel D: Long-term performance             
             
  Without entropy balancing  With entropy balancing 
             
 
 Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
 
Guider  
Non-
guider  
Test of 
diff. 
             
  mean  mean  t-stat  mean  mean  t-stat 
  median  median    median  median   
             
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst,t+11  0.039   -0.001   4.39***  0.039   -0.015  5.79*** 
 -0.074   -0.133      -0.074   -0.122   
Industry-adjusted return on assetst,t+11  0.117   0.028   18.61***  0.117   0.104  3.28*** 
 0.093   0.041      0.093   0.093   
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert,t+11  0.445   0.474   -1.71*  0.445   0.398  2.33*** 
 0.082   0.149      0.082   0.078   
Industry-adjusted sales growtht,t+11  0.168   0.502   -21.26***  0.168   0.166  0.32 
 0.083   0.118      0.083   0.068   
Industry-adjusted operating cash 
flowst,t+11 
 0.145   0.053   24.49***  0.145   0.123  7.45*** 
 0.112   0.049      0.112   0.094   
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  11,494   51,362    11,494   51,362   
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
(continued) 
 
Panel E: Entropy balancing weights             
             
 
 Guider  
Non-
guider   
 
    
 
             
  mean  mean         
  median  median         
             
Entropy balancing weights  1.000  0.224         
 1.000  0.077         
            
Distribution of entropy balancing 
weights:     
 
  
 
    
 
            
0.0 < x ≤ 0.1  0   28,446          
0.1 < x ≤ 0.2  0   7,342         
0.2 < x ≤ 0.3  0   3,847          
0.3 < x ≤ 0.4  0   2,512          
0.4 < x ≤ 0.5  0   2,002          
0.5 < x ≤ 0.6  0   1,474          
0.6 < x ≤ 0.7  0   1,193          
0.7 < x ≤ 0.8  0   961          
0.8 < x ≤ 0.9  0   692          
0.9 < x < 1.0  0   586          
x = 1  11,494   0         
x > 1.0  0   2,307          
             
Number of firm-quarter observations  11,494  51,362         
             
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for quarterly guiders and non-guiders. Quarterly guiders are defined 
as firms that provide earnings guidance for every quarter over a minimum of twelve consecutive quarters, 
and non-guiders are defined as firms that do not provide earnings guidance for any quarter over a minimum 
of twelve consecutive quarters. In the first three columns of Panels A, B, C, and D, I report descriptive 
statistics that compare quarterly guiders to non-guiders. In the last three columns of Panels A, B, C, and D, 
I report descriptive statistics that compare quarterly guiders to non-guiders where the sample has been 
reweighted using entropy balancing. I balance on each of the firm characteristics listed in Panel A, as well 
as 2-digit SIC industry and year-quarter. Panel E reports descriptive statistics for the entropy balancing 
weights. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
 
  
 
64 
 
TABLE 3 
Determinants of Quarterly Earnings Guidance 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Guidert  Marginal effects 
     
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  -0.075   -1.701 
 (-1.431)    
Managerial abilityt  -0.171   -0.201 
 (-0.474)    
Book-to-market ratiot-1  0.168   0.644 
 (1.041)    
Leveraget-1  -0.575**   -1.781 
 (-2.116)    
Bid-ask spreadt-1  -0.570***   -1.427 
 (-2.803)    
Analyst forecast dispersiont  -0.054*   -0.130 
 (-1.749)    
Return volatilityt-1  -7.012**   -1.085 
 (-2.117)    
Litigation industryt  0.358*   3.452 
 (1.675)    
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  0.912***   13.622 
 (11.343)    
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  1.045**   1.640 
 (2.440)    
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  0.707***   3.253 
 (3.010)    
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  0.099   0.035 
 (0.128)    
Life cycle: Growtht-1  0.227***   2.226 
 (2.755)    
Life cycle: Maturet-1  0.194**   1.835 
 (2.223)    
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.096   0.920 
 (1.071)    
Life cycle: Declinet-1  -0.202*   -1.758 
 (-1.809)    
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  0.095   0.188 
 (1.393)    
Industry-adjusted return on assetst  0.431   0.146 
 (0.421)    
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  1.398***   1.972 
 (3.520)    
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  -0.252***   -0.318 
 (-3.257)    
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  2.038***   0.775 
 (3.597)    
     
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects  Yes   
Number of observations  61,171   
Pseudo R2  0.229    
Area under the ROC curve  0.825   
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Quarterly Earnings Guidance 
(continued) 
     
a  
  
 
This table reports a logistic regression that examines the determinants of quarterly earnings guidance. The 
dependent variable in Column (1) is set equal to one for quarterly guiders, and zero for non-guiders. 
Quarterly guiders are defined as firms that provide earnings guidance for every quarter over a minimum of 
twelve consecutive quarters, and non-guiders are defined as firms that do not provide earnings guidance for 
any quarter over a minimum of twelve consecutive quarters. The marginal effects presented in Column (2) 
are calculated as the change in the probability of providing quarterly earnings guidance that results from 
moving from the first to the third quartile of each independent variable’s distribution when all independent 
variables are set at their means, multiplied by 100. The only exceptions are the marginal effects presented 
for Litigation Industry, Life cycle: Growth, Life cycle: Mature, Life cycle: Shake-out, and Life cycle: 
Decline, which are calculated as the change in the probability of providing quarterly earnings guidance that 
results from moving from zero to one when all independent variables are set at their means, multiplied by 
100. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Firm-
clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. The regression is estimated with 
industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
a 
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TABLE 4 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Short-Term Earnings Expectations 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Meet final 
analyst 
forecastt  
Meet initial 
analyst 
forecastt  
Just meet 
final analyst 
forecastt  
Just miss 
final analyst 
forecastt 
         
Guidert  0.119***   0.043***   0.053***   0.006 
 (14.669)   (4.770)   (5.805)   (1.381) 
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  0.015***   0.027***   -0.004   -0.005** 
 (3.237)   (4.592)   (-0.877)   (-2.446) 
Managerial abilityt  0.062**   0.106***   -0.103***   -0.050*** 
 (2.043)   (2.975)   (-3.511)   (-3.059) 
Book-to-market ratiot-1  0.005   -0.041**   -0.116***   -0.035*** 
 (0.320)   (-2.301)   (-7.206)   (-4.243) 
Leveraget-1  0.058**   0.000   -0.116***   -0.038*** 
 (2.514)   (0.020)   (-5.049)   (-3.285) 
Bid-ask spreadt-1  0.004   0.037**   0.064***   0.010 
 (0.339)   (2.287)   (4.704)   (1.215) 
Analyst forecast dispersiont  -0.006   -0.003   -0.014***   -0.007*** 
 (-1.219)   (-0.605)   (-5.328)   (-7.659) 
Return volatilityt-1  0.446   -0.265   -0.822**   -0.595** 
 (1.217)   (-0.587)   (-2.278)   (-2.656) 
Litigation industryt  0.033**   0.056***   0.033**   0.001 
 (2.651)   (3.649)   (2.243)   (0.095) 
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  0.002   -0.023***   0.012   0.014*** 
 (0.316)   (-2.789)   (1.482)   (3.628) 
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  0.175***   0.359***   -0.091**   -0.082*** 
 (4.343)   (8.470)   (-2.537)   (-4.287) 
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  0.003   -0.051**   0.051**   0.015 
 (0.194)   (-2.432)   (2.647)   (1.524) 
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  -0.039   -0.013   -0.036   0.040 
 (-0.573)   (-0.139)   (-0.456)   (0.853) 
Life cycle: Growtht-1  0.018   0.037***   -0.010   0.002 
 (1.594)   (2.773)   (-0.842)   (0.216) 
Life cycle: Maturet-1  0.017   0.038***   -0.009   0.004 
 (1.580)   (2.856)   (-0.709)   (0.488) 
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.014   0.040**   -0.022*   -0.001 
 (1.157)   (2.549)   (-1.797)   (-0.169) 
Life cycle: Declinet-1  -0.000   0.038*   -0.051***   0.004 
 (-0.013)   (1.831)   (-3.138)   (0.392) 
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  0.183***   0.660***   0.005   -0.037*** 
 (11.850)   (22.376)   (0.357)   (-3.530) 
Industry-adjusted return on assetst  1.218***   1.927***   0.028   -0.043 
 (8.369)   (8.839)   (0.225)   (-0.641) 
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  -0.056*   0.021   0.034   0.020 
 (-1.740)   (0.562)   (1.049)   (0.921) 
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  0.198***   0.329***   -0.084***   -0.048*** 
 (7.916)   (9.632)   (-4.519)   (-4.624) 
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  0.263**   0.108   -0.210**   -0.093 
 (2.277)   (0.781)   (-2.279)   (-1.609) 
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TABLE 4 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Short-Term Earnings Expectations 
(continued) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Meet final 
analyst 
forecastt  
Meet initial 
analyst 
forecastt  
Just meet 
final analyst 
forecastt  
Just miss 
final analyst 
forecastt 
         
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  62,856   62,856   62,856   62,856 
Adjusted R2  0.066   0.163   0.045   0.012 
         
χ2 test: β1Final = β1Initial or 
            β1JustMeet = β1JustMiss 
 107.72*** 
(0.000)  
25.57*** 
(0.000) 
         
a  
 
  
 
   
This table reports OLS regressions where the propensity to meet (or miss) analysts’ quarterly earnings 
forecasts is compared between quarterly guiders and non-guiders. The sample is reweighted via entropy 
balancing to improve the comparability of treatment and control observations. The initial analyst consensus 
forecast is estimated at the beginning of quarter t, whereas the final analyst consensus forecast is estimated 
at the earnings announcement date for quarter t. I consider a firm as just meeting or just missing analysts’ 
earnings expectations when actual earnings deviate by a penny or less from the final analyst consensus 
forecast. At the bottom of the table, I use χ2 tests to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on Guider (β1) is 
equal in Columns (1) and (2) or in Columns (3) and (4). The corresponding p-value is reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. Each regression 
is estimated with industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
a 
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TABLE 5 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and 10-K and Conference Call Language 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  10-K:  
Short-term words 
÷ Long-term 
wordst  
10-K:  
% Long-term 
view wordst  
Conference call: 
Short-term words 
÷ Long-term 
wordst 
       
Guidert  0.030***   -0.000   0.169* 
 (2.701)   (-0.161)   (1.954) 
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  -0.018***   0.005***   0.024 
 (-2.862)   (3.524)   (0.378) 
Managerial abilityt  0.123***   -0.042***   0.011 
 (3.261)   (-4.540)   (0.036) 
Book-to-market ratiot-1  -0.082***   0.018***   0.256 
 (-4.198)   (3.999)   (0.699) 
Leveraget-1  -0.167***   0.026***   -0.345 
 (-5.350)   (4.362)   (-1.148) 
Bid-ask spreadt-1  -0.004   0.004   -2.146 
 (-0.235)   (1.172)   (-1.125) 
Analyst forecast dispersiont  0.001   0.001   1.072** 
 (0.181)   (0.741)   (2.616) 
Return volatilityt-1  0.640*   -0.169**   16.868** 
 (1.859)   (-2.549)   (2.220) 
Litigation industryt  0.043*   -0.023***   -0.053 
 (1.984)   (-4.623)   (-0.388) 
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  0.001   -0.001   0.165 
 (0.083)   (-0.506)   (1.432) 
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  0.038   -0.006   -0.400 
 (0.859)   (-0.797)   (-0.472) 
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  -0.026   0.006   0.285 
 (-1.114)   (1.260)   (1.192) 
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  0.038   -0.048***   -0.935* 
 (0.506)   (-3.265)   (-1.788) 
Life cycle: Growtht-1  0.006   0.003   -0.256 
 (0.695)   (1.431)   (-1.599) 
Life cycle: Maturet-1  -0.004   0.006***   -0.420*** 
 (-0.451)   (2.841)   (-2.820) 
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.030***   0.001   -0.276* 
 (3.252)   (0.505)   (-1.972) 
Life cycle: Declinet-1  0.055***   -0.005**   -0.385* 
 (4.515)   (-2.608)   (-1.715) 
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  0.020**   -0.003   0.285 
 (2.358)   (-1.575)   (1.333) 
Industry-adjusted return on assetst  -0.170   0.062***   4.380** 
 (-1.229)   (2.708)   (2.426) 
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  -0.057   -0.005   0.647 
 (-1.193)   (-0.597)   (0.819) 
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  -0.005   -0.004**   -0.116 
 (-0.395)   (-2.069)   (-0.446) 
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  0.110   0.018   1.403 
 (1.456)   (1.155)   (1.030) 
       
 
69 
 
TABLE 5 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and 10-K and Conference Call Language 
(continued) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  10-K:  
Short-term words 
÷ Long-term 
wordst  
10-K:  
% Long-term 
view wordst  
Conference call: 
Short-term words 
÷ Long-term 
wordst 
       
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  51,325   51,325   3,275 
Adjusted R2  0.125   0.343   0.382 
       
A    
  
 
This table reports OLS regressions where 10-K and conference call language is compared between 
quarterly guiders and non-guiders. The sample is reweighted via entropy balancing to improve the 
comparability of treatment and control observations. I use Python to analyze firms’ 10-K and conference 
call language. The dependent variable in Column (1) represents a ratio of short-term 10-K words to long-
term 10-K words (e.g., short-run, long-run). The dependent variable in Column (2) represents the fraction 
of total 10-K words that reflect taking a long-term view (e.g., sustainability, firm value, social 
responsibility). The dependent variable in Column (3) represents a ratio of short-term conference call words 
to long-term conference call words, following the methodology developed by Brochet, Loumioti, and 
Serafeim (2015). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. 
Each regression is estimated with industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
a 
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TABLE 6 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.054**   0.013   0.047***   0.002   0.022*** 
(2.005)   (1.628)   (3.152)   (0.099)   (3.784) 
ln(Market value of equity)t-1 -0.019   0.033***   -0.019**   -0.019*   0.017*** 
(-1.428)   (6.999)   (-2.367)   (-1.968)   (5.195) 
Managerial abilityt 0.035   0.036   0.083   -0.013   0.071*** 
(0.426)   (1.154)   (1.330)   (-0.150)   (3.047) 
Book-to-market ratiot-1 0.031   -0.159***   -0.007   -0.430***   -0.140*** 
(0.503)   (-7.692)   (-0.194)   (-11.843)   (-11.730) 
Leveraget-1 0.310***   -0.062**   -0.025   -0.419***   -0.125*** 
(4.429)   (-2.486)   (-0.485)   (-5.373)   (-6.924) 
Bid-ask spreadt-1 0.117**   0.053**   0.099***   -0.003   -0.002 
(2.010)   (2.376)   (3.196)   (-0.075)   (-0.169) 
Analyst forecast dispersiont -0.050***   -0.013***   0.006   0.012   -0.011*** 
(-5.184)   (-3.192)   (0.677)   (0.789)   (-3.864) 
Return volatilityt-1 0.074   -1.042**   -0.938   3.430***   0.307 
(0.044)   (-2.441)   (-1.587)   (4.290)   (1.246) 
Litigation industryt -0.012   -0.058***   -0.130***   -0.007   0.011 
(-0.275)   (-3.117)   (-3.656)   (-0.197)   (1.038) 
ln(Number of analysts)t-1 0.003   -0.015**   0.054***   0.025   0.014*** 
(0.109)   (-2.109)   (3.832)   (1.395)   (2.827) 
Transient institutional ownershipt-1 -0.113   -0.040   -0.116   0.428***   0.057* 
(-0.881)   (-1.044)   (-1.601)   (2.799)   (1.920) 
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1 0.088   0.051***   0.041   -0.162***   0.015 
(1.560)   (3.014)   (1.194)   (-3.662)   (1.134) 
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1 -0.052   0.051   -0.048   0.045   0.051 
(-0.236)   (0.719)   (-0.326)   (0.139)   (1.130) 
Life cycle: Growtht-1 0.030   0.042***   -0.045***   -0.125**   0.062*** 
(1.268)   (4.636)   (-3.123)   (-2.456)   (8.367) 
Life cycle: Maturet-1 0.067***   0.073***   0.012   -0.156***   0.083*** 
(2.747)   (7.705)   (0.822)   (-2.967)   (11.039) 
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1 0.051*   0.045***   0.001   -0.154***   0.059*** 
(1.805)   (4.932)   (0.096)   (-2.813)   (7.953) 
Life cycle: Declinet-1 0.062   -0.006   0.056*   0.004   0.004 
(1.496)   (-0.407)   (1.729)   (0.060)   (0.358) 
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst 0.171***   0.119***   -0.065***   0.316***   0.076*** 
(3.604)   (9.401)   (-3.053)   (9.100)   (8.276) 
Industry-adjusted return on assetst -0.303   4.266***   -3.355***   -2.247***   2.034*** 
(-0.934)   (10.421)   (-12.095)   (-6.771)   (9.462) 
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert 0.009   0.132***   10.817***   -0.249***   0.062** 
(0.104)   (3.346)   (98.598)   (-3.203)   (2.289) 
Industry-adjusted sales growtht 0.091**   -0.183***   -1.290***   0.986***   -0.105*** 
(2.371)   (-9.160)   (-24.280)   (11.146)   (-7.130) 
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst 1.146***   1.066***   -1.868***   -0.512*   1.960*** 
(4.451)   (6.167)   (-8.038)   (-1.879)   (16.193) 
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TABLE 6 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
(continued) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856 
Adjusted R2 0.036  0.547  0.897  0.139  0.598 
          
          
This table reports OLS regressions where the long-term performance of quarterly guiders and non-guiders 
is compared. The sample is reweighted via entropy balancing to improve the comparability of treatment 
and control observations. Industry-adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the median 
performance by 2-digit SIC industry from the firm’s performance. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-statistics for 
two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. Each regression is estimated with industry and year-quarter 
fixed effects (not reported). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See 
variable definitions in Appendix A. 
A 
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TABLE 7 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
Cross-Sections: Information Asymmetry, Managerial Ability, and Litigation Risk 
 
Panel A: Information asymmetry 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.018  0.006  0.023  -0.015  0.018** 
(0.586)  (0.589)  (1.286)  (-0.836)  (2.429) 
High analyst forecast dispersiont -0.132***  -0.044***  -0.073***  -0.017  -0.024*** 
(-4.751)  (-5.194)  (-4.291)  (-0.904)  (-3.869) 
Guidert × High analyst forecast 
dispersiont 
0.075**  0.013  0.051**  0.042  0.008 
(1.990)  (1.011)  (2.012)  (0.960)  (0.928) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856 
Adjusted R2 0.036  0.548  0.897  0.139  0.598 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0 0.093**  0.190*  0.074***  0.027  0.026*** 
 (0.011)  (0.082)  (0.001)  (0.555)  (0.001) 
          
          
Panel B: Managerial ability 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
High management forecast accuracyt 0.052*  0.015*  0.035**  -0.022  0.008 
(1.903)  (1.849)  (2.162)  (-0.803)  (1.353) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 11,494  11,494  11,494  11,494  11,494 
Adjusted R2 0.059  0.558  0.903  0.150  0.620 
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TABLE 7 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
Cross-Sections: Information Asymmetry, Managerial Ability, and Litigation Risk 
(continued) 
 
Panel C: Litigation risk 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.062*  0.019  0.035*  -0.015  0.025*** 
 (1.666)  (1.616)  (1.720)  (-0.482)  (3.181) 
Litigation industryt -0.004  -0.053***  -0.141***  -0.024  0.013 
 (-0.097)  (-2.960)  (-3.713)  (-0.633)  (1.240) 
Guidert × Litigation industryt -0.014  -0.010  0.022  0.033  -0.005 
 (-0.273)  (-0.586)  (0.727)  (0.686)  (-0.438) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856 
Adjusted R2 0.036  0.547  0.897  0.140  0.598 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0 0.048  0.009  0.057**  0.017  0.020** 
 (0.196)  (0.430)  (0.012)  (0.622)  (0.022) 
          
a          
This table reports OLS regressions where long-term performance is compared between quarterly guiders 
and non-guiders. The sample is reweighted via entropy balancing to improve the comparability of treatment 
and control observations. Industry-adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the median 
performance by 2-digit SIC industry from the firm’s performance. Panel A examines whether the 
relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and long-term performance differs based on information 
asymmetry. Panel B examines whether the relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and long-term 
performance differs based on managerial ability. Panel C examines whether the relationship between 
quarterly earnings guidance and long-term performance differs based on litigation risk. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-
clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. Each regression is estimated with 
industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
A 
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TABLE 8 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Earnings Management and Underinvestment 
 
Panel A: Earnings management 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Discretionary 
R&D 
expensest  
Discretionary 
SG&A 
expensest  
Discretionary 
accrualst  
Total earnings 
managementt 
         
Guidert  0.222***   0.238  -0.037   -0.858*** 
 (3.377)   (1.377)  (-0.691)   (-3.370) 
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  -0.004   -0.220**  0.006   0.031 
  (-0.123)   (-2.431)  (0.184)   (0.236) 
Managerial abilityt  1.495***   6.374***  1.058***   -6.477*** 
  (6.100)   (7.239)  (5.581)   (-6.133) 
Book-to-market ratiot-1  -0.383***   -1.912***  -1.069***   0.167 
  (-3.337)   (-5.851)  (-9.708)   (0.369) 
Leveraget-1  0.002   -0.245  -1.014***   -0.839 
  (0.013)   (-0.469)  (-6.249)   (-1.157) 
Bid-ask spreadt-1  0.210**   0.399  0.457***   -0.131 
  (2.017)   (1.344)  (4.187)   (-0.350) 
Analyst forecast dispersiont  0.055*   -0.012  0.066***   -0.014 
  (1.860)   (-0.195)  (2.864)   (-0.196) 
Return volatilityt-1  3.924   8.550  9.004***   -3.686 
  (1.623)   (1.372)  (3.053)   (-0.449) 
Litigation industryt  0.726***   0.513  0.082   -2.551*** 
  (7.851)   (1.407)  (0.828)   (-5.648) 
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  0.210***   0.363**  -0.040   -0.864*** 
  (4.128)   (2.517)  (-0.944)   (-4.329) 
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  0.477*   0.823  0.171   -1.586* 
  (1.991)   (1.190)  (0.685)   (-1.696) 
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  -0.157   -0.314  -0.538***   -0.064 
  (-1.224)   (-0.867)  (-4.679)   (-0.128) 
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  0.673   2.354*  -0.272   -2.688 
  (1.564)   (1.857)  (-0.714)   (-1.608) 
Life cycle: Growtht-1  0.008   -0.037  -0.017   -0.178 
  (0.146)   (-0.263)  (-0.183)   (-0.788) 
Life cycle: Maturet-1  0.036   0.333**  0.077   -0.353 
  (0.628)   (2.307)  (0.894)   (-1.499) 
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.204***   0.417***  0.027   -0.922*** 
  (3.291)   (2.927)  (0.323)   (-3.730) 
Life cycle: Declinet-1  0.416***   0.555***  0.022   -1.123*** 
  (5.369)   (2.961)  (0.215)   (-4.193) 
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  -0.037   0.013  0.190*   0.351 
  (-0.539)   (0.077)  (1.912)   (1.286) 
Industry-adjusted return on assetst  -15.882***   -26.744***  -20.630***   39.321*** 
  (-11.445)   (-8.373)  (-6.351)   (8.227) 
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  1.442***   8.727***  1.910***   -6.429*** 
  (5.676)   (7.391)  (6.174)   (-5.235) 
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  0.528***   -1.166***  0.742***   0.338 
  (5.603)   (-4.328)  (5.118)   (0.905) 
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  1.294**   2.184  1.159   -9.411*** 
  (2.215)   (1.392)  (0.723)   (-3.769) 
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TABLE 8 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Earnings Management and Underinvestment 
(continued) 
 
Panel A: Earnings management (continued) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Discretionary 
R&D 
expensest  
Discretionary 
SG&A 
expensest  
Discretionary 
accrualst  
Total earnings 
managementt 
         
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  60,098   60,098  44,428   44,428 
Adjusted R2  0.203   0.209   0.168   0.137 
         
         
Panel B: Underinvestment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Under-
investment in 
capital assetst  
Under-
investment in 
R&Dt  
Under-
investment in 
M&At  
Total under-
investmentt 
         
Guidert  -0.018   -0.045**   -0.010   -0.016 
 (-1.358)   (-2.274)   (-1.404)   (-1.103) 
ln(Market value of equity)t-1  -0.012*   0.046***   -0.018***   0.035*** 
  (-1.735)   (4.657)   (-4.109)   (4.654) 
Managerial abilityt  0.258***   -0.545***   0.062*   -0.328*** 
  (4.921)   (-7.945)   (2.002)   (-5.759) 
Book-to-market ratiot-1  0.154***   0.351***   -0.030**   0.328*** 
  (5.213)   (10.909)   (-2.248)   (12.522) 
Leveraget-1  0.069*   0.328***   -0.003   0.289*** 
  (1.970)   (6.105)   (-0.133)   (6.977) 
Bid-ask spreadt-1  0.000   -0.071***   0.002   -0.046* 
  (0.019)   (-2.704)   (0.114)   (-1.976) 
Analyst forecast dispersiont  0.005   -0.010   0.006***   -0.004 
  (1.040)   (-1.268)   (2.781)   (-0.652) 
Return volatilityt-1  -1.486***   -2.549***   0.341   -2.607*** 
  (-3.175)   (-3.650)   (0.883)   (-5.147) 
Litigation industryt  0.018   -0.303***   -0.017   -0.197*** 
  (0.849)   (-9.678)   (-1.354)   (-7.480) 
ln(Number of analysts)t-1  -0.022*   -0.068***   -0.014*   -0.062*** 
  (-1.952)   (-4.387)   (-1.850)   (-5.116) 
Transient institutional ownershipt-1  0.007   -0.154**   0.004   -0.158*** 
  (0.129)   (-2.021)   (0.099)   (-3.005) 
Quasi-indexer institutional ownershipt-1  0.024   0.017   -0.028*   0.032 
  (0.832)   (0.421)   (-1.699)   (1.045) 
Dedicated institutional ownershipt-1  -0.027   -0.242*   0.044   -0.113 
  (-0.278)   (-1.748)   (0.764)   (-0.945) 
Life cycle: Growtht-1  -0.027**   0.011   -0.022   -0.029** 
  (-2.053)   (0.817)   (-1.547)   (-2.368) 
Life cycle: Maturet-1  -0.010   0.021   -0.018   0.008 
  (-0.858)   (1.523)   (-1.423)   (0.572) 
Life cycle: Shake-outt-1  0.033**   -0.032**   -0.007   -0.002 
  (2.399)   (-2.018)   (-0.488)   (-0.118) 
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TABLE 8 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Earnings Management and Underinvestment 
(continued) 
         
Panel B: Underinvestment (continued) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Under-
investment in 
capital assetst  
Under-
investment in 
R&Dt  
Under-
investment in 
M&At  
Total under-
investmentt 
         
Life cycle: Declinet-1  0.049**   -0.080***   0.003   -0.013 
  (2.408)   (-3.738)   (0.170)   (-0.682) 
Size- and industry-adjusted returnst  -0.015   -0.083***   -0.019   -0.046*** 
  (-1.014)   (-5.449)   (-1.145)   (-2.947) 
Industry-adjusted return on assetst  -0.561***   2.042***   0.172   1.053*** 
  (-3.955)   (9.420)   (1.554)   (6.167) 
Industry-adjusted asset turnovert  -0.196***   0.266***   0.039   0.277*** 
  (-3.332)   (3.895)   (1.362)   (4.444) 
Industry-adjusted sales growtht  -0.007   -0.119***   -0.110***   -0.141*** 
  (-0.335)   (-4.935)   (-5.692)   (-7.190) 
Industry-adjusted operating cash flowst  -0.465***   -0.436***   0.122   -0.631*** 
  (-4.571)   (-3.281)   (1.126)   (-5.445) 
         
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  62,856   62,856   62,856   62,856 
Adjusted R2  0.099   0.430   0.245   0.256 
         
         
This table reports OLS regressions that compare earnings management and underinvestment between 
quarterly guiders and non-guiders. The sample is reweighted via entropy balancing to improve the 
comparability of treatment and control observations. Panel A reports OLS regressions where earnings 
management is compared between quarterly guiders and non-guiders. I calculate discretionary R&D 
expenses and discretionary SG&A expenses as the residuals from models that predict a firm’s expected 
R&D and SG&A expenses by 2-digit SIC industry and year-quarter (Vorst 2016). Following Call, Chen, 
and Miao (2014), I calculate discretionary accruals as the absolute value of the residuals from the Jones 
(1991) model after controlling for economic losses, estimated by 2-digit SIC industry and year-quarter. To 
form my total earnings management measure, I sum the decile rankings of a firm’s discretionary R&D 
expenses, discretionary SG&A expenses, and discretionary accruals, where discretionary R&D and SG&A 
expenses are multiplied by negative one prior to ranking so that they are increasing in earnings 
management. Panel B reports OLS regressions where underinvestment is compared between quarterly 
guiders and non-guiders. Each underinvestment variable is an indicator set equal to one in quarters when a 
firm’s investments fall into the bottom quartile of unexpected investment. I calculate unexpected 
investment as the residual from regressing investments on lagged sales growth by 2-digit SIC industry and 
year-quarter (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are 
reported in parentheses. Each regression is estimated with industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not 
reported). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in 
Appendix A. 
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TABLE 9 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
Cross-Sections: Transient Institutional Ownership, Analyst Following, and 
Stock-Based Compensation 
 
Panel A: Transient institutional ownership 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.048  0.026**  0.072***  -0.006  0.026*** 
 (1.205)  (2.125)  (3.103)  (-0.215)  (3.203) 
High transient institutional ownershipt 0.019  0.006  0.007  0.051**  0.010 
 (0.683)  (0.722)  (0.374)  (2.600)  (1.618) 
Guidert × High transient institutional 
ownershipt 
0.011  -0.019  -0.038  0.012  -0.006 
(0.237)  (-1.473)  (-1.427)  (0.355)  (-0.685) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856 
Adjusted R2 0.036  0.547  0.897  0.138  0.598 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0 0.058*  0.006  0.033*  0.007  0.020*** 
 (0.070)  (0.485)  (0.064)  (0.827)  (0.006) 
          
          
Panel B: Analyst following 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.067  0.023**  0.058***  -0.061**  0.022*** 
 (1.667)  (2.043)  (2.749)  (-2.057)  (2.938) 
High analyst followingt 0.001  -0.008  0.051***  -0.027  0.010 
 (0.049)  (-0.891)  (2.721)  (-0.906)  (1.567) 
Guidert × High analyst followingt -0.018   -0.013   -0.016   0.088**   0.000 
 (-0.403)   (-1.025)   (-0.669)   (2.373)   (0.029) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856 
Adjusted R2 0.036  0.547  0.897  0.140  0.598 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0 0.049  0.010  0.042**  0.027  0.022*** 
 (0.113)  (0.312)  (0.019)  (0.348)  (0.003) 
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TABLE 9 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
Cross-Sections: Transient Institutional Ownership, Analyst Following, and 
Stock-Based Compensation 
(continued) 
 
Panel C: Stock-based compensation 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.067**  0.009  0.037*  0.023  0.014* 
 (2.019)  (0.829)  (1.878)  (0.754)  (1.682) 
High stock-based compensationt 0.034  -0.033***  -0.014  -0.012  -0.003 
 (0.977)  (-2.982)  (-0.619)  (-0.630)  (-0.412) 
Guidert × High stock-based 
compensationt 
-0.083*   -0.011   0.002   0.031   -0.001 
(-1.842)   (-0.727)   (0.076)   (0.757)   (-0.065) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 36,692  36,692  36,692  36,692  36,692 
Adjusted R2 0.047   0.565   0.908   0.146   0.626 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0 -0.016  -0.001  0.039*  0.054  0.013 
 (0.719)  (0.913)  (0.090)  (0.150)  (0.122) 
          
a          
This table reports OLS regressions where long-term performance is compared between quarterly guiders 
and non-guiders. The sample is reweighted via entropy balancing to improve the comparability of treatment 
and control observations. Industry-adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the median 
performance by 2-digit SIC industry from the firm’s performance. Panel A examines whether the 
relationship between quarterly earnings guidance and long-term performance differs based on transient 
institutional ownership. Panel B examines whether the relationship between quarterly earnings guidance 
and long-term performance differs based on analyst coverage. Panel C examines whether the relationship 
between quarterly earnings guidance differs based on stock-based compensation. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-
statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. Each regression is estimated with industry and 
year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
A 
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TABLE 10 
Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
 
Panel A: Short-term earnings expectations 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  
Meet final 
analyst 
forecastt  
Meet initial 
analyst 
forecastt  
Just meet 
final analyst 
forecastt  
Just miss 
final analyst 
forecastt 
          
Guidert   0.164***   0.080***   0.055***   -0.006 
   (12.576)   (5.931)   (4.628)   (-0.702) 
          
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   8,162   8,162   8,162   8,162 
Adjusted R2   0.092   0.167   0.034   0.006 
          
χ2 test: β1Final = β1Initial or 
            β1JustMeet = β1JustMiss   
49.94*** 
(0.000) 
 19.57*** 
(0.000) 
          
          
Panel B: 10-K language 
       (1)  (2) 
 
      
10-K:  
Short-term 
words ÷ 
Long-term 
wordst  
10-K:  
% Long-
term view 
wordst 
          
Guidert       0.023*   0.001 
       (1.689)   (0.229) 
          
Controls       Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects       Yes  Yes 
Number of observations       6,078   6,078 
Adjusted R2       0.114   0.340 
          
          
Panel C: Long-term performance 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.074**   0.014   0.039*   -0.035   0.020*** 
 (2.340)   (1.373)   (1.854)   (-1.621)   (2.815) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 8,162   8,162   8,162   8,162   8,162 
Adjusted R2 0.029   0.581   0.893   0.198   0.613 
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TABLE 10 
Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
(continued) 
          
          
Panel D: Earnings management 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  
Discretionary 
R&D 
expensest  
Discretionary 
SG&A 
expensest  
Discretionary 
accrualst  
Total 
earnings 
managementt 
          
Guidert   0.301***   0.687***  -0.156**   -1.452*** 
   (3.610)   (3.349)  (-2.193)   (-4.642) 
          
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   7,616   7,616  5,606   5,606 
Adjusted R2   0.245   0.255   0.165   0.168 
          
          
Panel E: Underinvestment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  
Under-
investment 
in capital 
assetst  
Under-
investment 
in R&Dt  
Under-
investment 
in M&At  
Total under-
investmentt 
          
Guidert   -0.014   -0.056**   -0.012   -0.026 
   (-0.866)   (-2.273)   (-1.388)   (-1.283) 
          
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   8,162   8,162   8,162   8,162 
Adjusted R2   0.098   0.379   0.282   0.245 
          
a          
This table reports OLS regressions related to my propensity score matching analysis, where firms that 
provide quarterly earnings guidance are matched to firms that do not provide quarterly earnings guidance 
based on their estimated propensities to provide quarterly earnings guidance. I estimate propensity scores 
for each observation in my sample by regressing an indicator variable set equal to one for quarterly guiders 
and zero for non-guiders on each of the firm characteristics listed in Panel A of Table 2. I then match each 
quarterly guider observation with the non-guider observation that has the closest propensity score, requiring 
that matches occur within the same 2-digit SIC industry and year-quarter. I use this matched sample of 
quarterly guiders and non-guiders to repeat the tests shown in Tables 4-6 and 8. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-
statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. Each regression is estimated with industry and 
year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
a 
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TABLE 11 
Difference-In-Difference Analysis 
 
Panel A: Short-term earnings expectations 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  
Meet final 
analyst 
forecastt  
Meet initial 
analyst 
forecastt  
Just meet 
final analyst 
forecastt  
Just miss 
final analyst 
forecastt 
          
Postt   0.003   0.007   0.008   0.000 
   (0.266)   (0.431)   (0.923)   (0.010) 
Startert   0.092***   0.017   0.040***   0.002 
   (6.710)   (0.988)   (2.708)   (0.192) 
Postt × Startert   0.065***   0.031   0.018   -0.009 
   (4.165)   (1.328)   (1.357)   (-0.788) 
          
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   12,878   12,878   12,878   12,878 
Adjusted R2   0.083   0.170   0.058   0.018 
          
χ2 test: β3Final = β3Initial or 
            β3JustMeet = β3JustMiss   
3.979** 
(0.046) 
 1.768 
(0.184) 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0   0.068***  0.039**  0.026**  -0.008 
   (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.043)  (0.357) 
          
          
Panel B: 10-K language 
       (1)  (2) 
 
      
10-K:  
Short-term 
words ÷ 
Long-term 
wordst  
10-K:  
% Long-
term view 
wordst 
          
Postt       -0.001  0.002* 
       (-0.122)  (1.679) 
Startert       0.024  0.006** 
       (1.441)  (2.035) 
Postt × Startert       0.018  -0.006*** 
       (1.565)  (-2.770) 
          
Controls       Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects       Yes  Yes 
Number of observations       11,537  11,537 
Adjusted R2       0.151   0.355 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0       0.017*  -0.003* 
       (0.091)  (0.076) 
          
          
 
 
82 
 
TABLE 11 
Difference-In-Difference Analysis 
(continued) 
 
Panel C: Long-term performance 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Postt -0.061   -0.021**   0.005   -0.030   -0.015* 
 (-1.460)   (-2.032)   (0.207)   (-1.432)   (-1.973) 
Startert 0.041   0.001   0.049   0.042   0.017 
 (0.689)   (0.067)   (1.603)   (1.251)   (1.538) 
Postt × Startert 0.062   0.008   0.009   -0.002   0.013 
 (0.977)   (0.531)   (0.277)   (-0.055)   (1.251) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 12,878   12,878   12,878   12,878   12,878 
Adjusted R2 0.069   0.549   0.869   0.189   0.581 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0 0.001  -0.014  0.015  -0.032  -0.002 
 (0.984)  (0.218)  (0.595)  (0.154)  (0.827) 
          
          
Panel D: Earnings management 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  
Discretionary 
R&D 
expensest  
Discretionary 
SG&A 
expensest  
Discretionary 
accrualst  
Total 
earnings 
managementt 
          
Postt   0.022   0.110   -0.206   -0.050 
   (0.468)   (0.776)   (-0.908)   (-0.124) 
Startert   0.142   0.025   -0.245   0.531 
   (1.179)   (0.084)   (-1.021)   (0.844) 
Postt × Startert   -0.034   -0.004   0.034   -0.448 
   (-0.509)   (-0.016)   (0.145)   (-1.185) 
          
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   9,493   9,493   1,845   1,845 
Adjusted R2   0.317   0.378   0.378   0.218 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0   -0.011  0.107  -0.172  -0.498 
   (0.860)  (0.557)  (0.426)  (0.150) 
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TABLE 11 
Difference-In-Difference Analysis 
(continued) 
 
Panel E: Underinvestment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
  
Under-
investment 
in capital 
assetst  
Under-
investment 
in R&Dt  
Under-
investment 
in M&At  
Total under-
investmentt 
          
Postt   -0.009  -0.004  -0.011  -0.018 
   (-0.663)  (-0.372)  (-0.894)  (-1.431) 
Startert   0.003  -0.046*  -0.027**  -0.013 
   (0.183)  (-1.776)  (-2.401)  (-0.585) 
Postt × Startert   -0.023  -0.010  0.025*  0.005 
   (-1.308)  (-0.583)  (1.708)  (0.251) 
          
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   12,878  12,878  12,878  12,878 
Adjusted R2   0.096   0.441   0.249   0.242 
          
F test: β1 + β3 = 0   -0.032**  -0.014  0.014  -0.013 
   (0.027)  (0.338)  (0.303)  (0.381) 
          
a          
This table reports OLS regressions related to my difference-in-difference analysis, where firms that initiate 
quarterly earnings guidance are matched to firms that continue to forgo quarterly earnings guidance. I 
identify 449 firms that initiate quarterly earnings guidance over my sample period of 2003 to 2015, and I 
use coarsened exact matching to identify matches in the quarter prior to earnings guidance initiation. I 
require that matches occur in the same year-quarter and 2-digit SIC industry. Additionally, matches must 
fall within the same quartile of analyst following, calculated by fiscal year and 1-digit SIC industry. Among 
firms that satisfy these requirements, I select the control firm with the closest market value of equity to the 
treatment firm. I then estimate my difference-in-difference analyses over the pre- and post- periods of 
quarters t-8 to t-1 and quarters t to t+7, respectively, where earnings guidance is initiated in quarter t. At 
the bottom of each panel, I use F and χ2 tests to test various hypotheses. The corresponding p-values are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in parentheses. 
Each regression is estimated with industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
a 
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TABLE 12 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
Robustness Tests: Performance Over Five Years and Additional Control Variables 
 
Panel A: Performance over five years 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+19  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+19  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+19  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+19  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+19 
          
Guidert 0.063  0.020  0.087**  -0.012  0.035*** 
 (1.149)  (1.195)  (2.283)  (-0.296)  (2.962) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 45,883  45,883  45,883  45,883  45,883 
Adjusted R2 0.042   0.522   0.863   0.142   0.586 
          
          
Panel B: Controlling for analysts’ long-term growth forecast 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.062**  0.007  0.024  0.018  0.018*** 
 (2.229)  (0.823)  (1.520)  (0.658)  (2.888) 
Analysts’ long-term growth forecastt 0.001  -0.004***  0.001  0.006***  -0.001 
 (0.594)  (-5.977)  (0.428)  (2.921)  (-1.101) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 39,345  39,345  39,345  39,345  39,345 
Adjusted R2 0.042   0.580   0.903   0.144   0.633 
          
          
Panel C: Controlling for competition 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.060**  0.016*  0.038**  0.003  0.023*** 
 (2.218)  (1.851)  (2.425)  (0.126)  (3.796) 
Competitiont -0.022  0.001  0.011  -0.037*  0.009 
 (-0.901)  (0.068)  (0.668)  (-1.800)  (1.603) 
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TABLE 12 
Quarterly Earnings Guidance and Long-Term Performance 
Robustness Tests: Performance Over Five Years and Additional Control Variables 
(continued) 
 
Panel C: Controlling for competition (continued) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 51,501  51,501  51,501  51,501  51,501 
Adjusted R2 0.039   0.563   0.901   0.147   0.617 
          
          
Panel D: Controlling for the firm’s propensity to meet the final analyst forecast 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Size- and 
industry-
adj. 
returnst,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
ROAt,t+11  
Industry-
adj. asset 
turnovert,t+11  
Industry-
adj. sales 
growtht,t+11  
Industry-
adj. 
operating 
cash 
flowst,t+11 
          
Guidert 0.041  0.015*  0.048***  -0.003  0.022*** 
 (1.497)  (1.780)  (3.266)  (-0.142)  (3.754) 
Meet final analyst forecastt 0.135***  0.007  -0.018**  0.004  0.009*** 
 (8.552)  (1.195)  (-2.018)  (0.388)  (2.851) 
          
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry and year-quarter fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856  62,856 
Adjusted R2 0.040   0.546   0.898   0.138   0.595 
          
a          
This table reports OLS regressions where long-term performance is compared between quarterly guiders 
and non-guiders. The sample is reweighted via entropy balancing to improve the comparability of treatment 
and control observations. Industry-adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the median 
performance by 2-digit SIC industry from the firm’s performance. Panel A examines whether there are 
differences in long-term performance between quarterly guiders and non-guiders over the next five years 
(quarters t to t+19). Panel B examines whether there are differences in long-term performance between 
quarterly guiders and non-guiders after controlling for analysts’ long-term growth forecast. Panel C 
examines whether there are differences in long-term performance between quarterly guiders and non-
guiders after controlling for competition. Panel D examines whether there are differences in long-term 
performance between quarterly guiders and non-guiders after controlling for the firm’s propensity to meet 
the final analyst consensus forecast. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level, respectively. Firm- and year-quarter-clustered t-statistics for two-tailed tests are reported in 
parentheses. Each regression is estimated with industry and year-quarter fixed effects (not reported). 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See variable definitions in Appendix A. 
A 
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